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## Space, Projection and the Banal in the Works of Jean-Philippe Toussaint and Nicholson Baker

This paper sets out to examine the relationship between space and banality in relation to two contemporary authors, Belgian author Jean-Philippe Toussaint and American author Nicholson Baker. In order to do so, it will bring together two theories from the disciplines of anthropology and psychoanalysis. The anthropological approach is derived from Marc Augé, Director of Studies at the *École des hautes études en sciences sociales* in Paris and central figure in contemporary anthropology. The psychoanalytic approach comes from Mahmoud Sami-Ali, Director of the *Centre International de Psychosomatique in Paris*, who teaches and writes extensively on the relationship between organic pathology and psychopathology, known as somatisation or the psychosomatic.

Sami-Ali theorises that we do not merely perceive but also project the real spaces around us. Augé's analysis addresses the psychological effects of contemporary spaces on inhabitants as subjects. Further, Sami-Ali's psychoanalytic theory of the banal as repression of subjectivity and Augé's anthropology of non-places can be brought into contact to suggest that certain kinds of space are banal. I shall discuss these theories and their intersection before going on to show how they can illuminate the work of Toussaint and Baker.

I want first to look at Marc Augé's theory relating to contemporary space. Augé examines certain kinds of spaces from an anthropological perspective – what he calls 'l'anthropologie du proche', focused as it is on our own western first-world societies, rather than on the exoticised, and formerly called 'primitive', societies of the

developing world.<sup>1</sup> Augé argues that we now inhabit an era of 'sur-modernité', 'sur' denoting excess, one aspect of which is an excess of space. Paradoxically, as the space to which we have access increases, so the planet appears to contract. As Augé says:

Nos premiers pas dans l'espace réduisent le nôtre à un point infime dont les photos prises par satellite nous donnent justement l'exacte mesure. (*Non-Lieux*, p. 44)

At the same time, however, the change of scale implied by space exploration, combined with the acceleration of means of transport and our total penetration of the planet via mass-media, increases the space we feel ourselves to inhabit.

This spatial overabundance has certain consequences: one of these is that the parts of this new expanded world available for us to adopt as our own, are, as Augé notes, 'largement fictifs [...] on pourrait dire qu'ils sont essentiellement des univers de reconnaissance' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 46). So we may have no first-hand knowledge of New York, Sydney or Bangkok, but we are able, at the sound of those names, to summon a ubiquitous image from a travel brochure or television programme.

Excess of space both produces and is produced by the movement of population and increases in urban concentrations. These entail the multiplication of means of transport and their associated places of departure and destination, as well as the replacement of older town centres by the satellisation of amenities, in the form of purpose-built leisure and commercial centres. It is these new kinds of man-made places, among others, that Augé has called 'non-lieux'. As we multiply and move around, these 'non-places' are created specifically for the individual in his role as consumer, as passenger.

The distinction that Augé makes between place and non-place derives from an opposition between place and space, where place signifies 'anthropological place'. Anthropological place always expresses a given group's identity: it symbolises both collective and individual

1 Marc Augé, *Non-Lieux: Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 15. Further references to this work are given as *Non-Lieux* after quotations in the body of the text.

identity, is both concrete and symbolic, and is used as organic social reference for the inhabitants. What all anthropological places have in common is that 'ils se veulent (on les veut) identitaires, relationnels et historiques' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 69).

In contrast, space is abstract and non-anthropological. It is a term generally applied to area, to a distance between points, or a temporal expanse, 'outer space' being one example. As such, it is in opposition to anthropological place:

Si un lieu peut se définir comme identitaire, relationnel et historique, un espace qui ne peut se définir ni comme identitaire, ni comme relationnel, ni comme historique définira un non-lieu. (*Non-Lieux*, p. 100)

For Augé, then, non-place is opposed to 'place' and aligned with 'space' in terms of its abstraction. Airports, hotel chains, shopping malls – created as a function of transport, leisure and consumption – non-places are urban, communal and uniform in style. They are depersonalised, familiar yet anonymous, belonging to everyone and yet to no one.

According to Augé, non-places are defined not just by their purpose and appearance, but by the relations of individuals to these places. These are relations of solitude, similitude, anonymity and contractuality. The space of non-place 'délivre celui qui y pénètre de ses déterminations habituelles', which are replaced by his coercion into the roles of passenger or consumer (*Non-Lieux*, p. 129). This occurs because non-places are designed to process large numbers of individuals who need never interact directly. Your shopping trolley or train ticket or boarding pass functions as your acceptance of your role within non-place, your justification for being there and your contract with the authority that governs the non-place you have entered. This authority will for the most part communicate with you by means of text, in the form of cash machine readouts, advertising, directional signs, instructions and prohibitions: 'Do not alight here'; 'Please take your advice slip'; 'We apologise for any inconvenience' and so on. All messages are addressed simultaneously and indiscriminately to each and any of us. As Augé says, they: 'fabriquent l'homme moyen' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 126).

I want to argue that Augé's non-places can be seen as spatial instances of what Sami-Ali calls the 'banal'. Like non-places, the banal is depersonalised signification, belonging to everyone and to no-one, and its form is one of repetitive neutrality. The banal is theorised as a suppression of subjectivity. To understand what Sami-Ali means by this, we must look briefly at what he considers to be the fundamental function of the psyche, synonymous with subjectivity: projection.

Sami-Ali's theory of somatisation, or the psychosomatic, posits the body as source of projection, and projection as the mechanism by which we simultaneously perceive and construct the space around us. The body is linked to our perception of space in fundamental ways. Sami-Ali cites the example of laterality, whereby we learn to distinguish between left and right by reference to the relevant side of the body (as in the childhood mnemonic 'my right hand is the hand I write with').<sup>2</sup> Here I shall omit further discussion of the role of the body, as well as of the importance of time, in order to concentrate on the relationship between projection and space.

For Sami-Ali, projection is synonymous with the Imaginary. The Imaginary is a function of the psyche that is best characterised as dreaming and the equivalents of dreaming in waking life (reverie, hallucination, illusion, belief, game, fantasy, delusion and so on).<sup>3</sup> Projection is the means by which the inner world appears as an outer world – it is the subjective perceived as objective, permitting the subject to 'être

- 2 The body's use as architectural model dates back at least to the Greek empire. See Vitruvius, first-century Roman architect, on the design of a Greek temple: 'Without symmetry and proportion there can be no principles in the design of any temple; that is, if there is no precise relation between its members, as in the case of those of a well shaped man.' Vitruvius, *The Ten Books On Architecture*, trans. by Morris Hickey Morgan (New York: Dover Publications, 1960), p. 72.
- 3 This conception of the Imaginary is to be distinguished from the more circumscribed Lacanian Imaginary, in that for Sami-Ali, the Imaginary is a function synonymous with projection, and thus with subjectivity itself (including language). For Lacan, language belongs to the Symbolic order, and the Imaginary is more specifically related to images and the development of the ego via the mirror stage.

soi hors de soi, absorbé par un réel qui est soi'.<sup>4</sup> This function is self-evident when considered in relation to dreams, where one is simultaneously entirely within the self and yet seemingly participating in an objective reality that is outside of the self. The dream is a case of pure projection, or the purely Imaginary, whereas when we are awake, what is perceived to be outside the self mingles with what is projected from inside the self. Projection and perception are inextricably linked, the objective internalised as subjective, and the subjective projected onto the objective.

Freudian psychopathology is based on repression of unconscious material, the failure of this repression, and the return of the repressed in the form of dreams or symptoms. The return of the repressed is thus the Imaginary function at work. Sami-Ali departs from Freud in that he posits another possibility: successful repression of the Imaginary function as such: 'Ici, tout est refoulement, sans retour du refoulé' (*Le Corps*, p. 4).

In the absence of the Imaginary function, Sami-Ali argues that a subject is emptied of his or her subjectivity; that is, the ability to project, to render the subjective objective. The void left by the absence of subjectivity is filled by what he calls 'une pathologie de l'adaptation' (*Le Corps*, pp. 3–4). The subject adapts to rules derived from the collective Imaginary, which pre-exists the subject. For Sami-Ali, it is this collective Imaginary whose form is the banal.

The banal is therefore social and not individual. The etymology of the word 'banal' reveals this collective dimension: it originally meant 'belonging to feudal service', which later evolved to mean 'of or belonging to the common people', or 'that which is commonplace'. It can thus be construed as depersonalised signification belonging to everyone and to no one.

Sami-Ali states that if the formula for the Imaginary function can be written  $a \neq a$  (as in dreams, where what is, is not), then the formula for the banal is  $a = a$ , since it is deprived of the Imaginary function's transformative power. The banal is therefore identical to itself, neutral,

- 4 Mahmoud Sami-Ali, *Le Corps, l'espace et le temps*, 2nd edn (Paris: Dunod, 1998), p. 69. Further references to this work are given as *Le Corps* after quotations in the body of the text.

literal: 'L'être du banal est un paraître absolu: il est immédiatement atteint mais jamais dépassé. Simplement il est ou il n'est pas.'<sup>5</sup> In Freudian terms, then, the banal consists only of manifest content, which conceals no other, latent content. It is depthless, existing only as surface. Moreover, the absence of subjectivity resulting from the repression of the Imaginary ensures that:

le banal a ainsi partie liée avec l'épuisement du contenu émotionnel et cognitif de l'objet, moyennant une répétition qui ne manque pas d'engendrer un équivoque sentiment de monotonie. (*Le Banal*, pp. 23–24)

This monotonous repetition results from a lack of 'becoming': the banal is not produced by the subject but by the collective. Additionally, according to Sami-Ali, it obscures those collective historical processes that have brought it into existence. Since the banal pre-exists the subject, it can be indefinitely reproduced, unaltered by those that adopt it. The banal can be spoken of as 'cliché', connoting this sense that something has been, and continues to be, endlessly reproduced without the intervention of subjectivity: 'Soustrait au devenir, le banal jouit d'une éternité qui est négation de la vie et éternité du factice' (*Le Banal*, p. 24). For Sami-Ali, no act of creation, for example that of writing, can exist without this intervention, without the Imaginary function. Creativity, art, aesthetics – and these are of course not uncontroversial terms – would seem on this analysis to exist in direct opposition to the banal.

It is worth noting in passing that this conception of the banal has much in common with Jean Baudrillard's notion of the simulacrum as neutral, transparent, unambiguous and self-coinciding. Baudrillard claims that the disappearance of a distinction between real and fake has led to the substitution of simulation for representation. The real has become the hyperreal: 'Il ne s'agit plus d'imitation, ni de redoublement, ni même de parodie. Il s'agit d'une substitution au réel des signes du réel.'<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Sami-Ali argues that the banal circumvents representation, and defies situation on the real/fake or reality/

5 Mahmoud Sami-Ali, *Le Banal* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), p. 24. Further references to this work are given as *Le Banal* after quotations in the body of the text.

6 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et Simulation* (Paris: Galilée, 1981), p. 11.

representation axis. As with Baudrillard, the gap between referent and image has closed: 'Image ou énoncé, le banal dit seulement qu'il est ce qu'il paraît' (*Le Banal*, p. 77).

One can say that Sami-Ali's collective Imaginary, derived from rules that pre-exist us, is manifested in the rules governing behaviour in Augé's non-places. The check-in area, departure lounge and boarding gates of an airport all require quite different behaviour from their occupants. Anyone transgressing the rules of non-place will soon find themselves corrected, if not by the governing authority then by their fellow passengers or customers (think of the reaction to the uninitiated tube traveller who stands on the left and walks on the right).

The experience of non-place contrasts with the organic and subjective interaction with anthropological place, which, as Augé says 'est [...] principe de sens pour ceux qui l'habitent' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 68). He discusses this principle by reference to 'le plan de la maison, les règles de la résidence, les quartiers de village, les autels, les places publiques, la découpe du terroir', not all of which will be relevant for our own society (*Non-Lieux*, p. 69). We can all observe this principle of the fundamental link between the spatial and the subjective: where we are born is in part constitutive of our sense of identity. Non-places are never going to be constitutive of identity in the same way. Instead, as Augé writes, 'c'est le non-lieu qui crée l'identité partagée des passagers, de la clientèle ou des conducteurs du dimanche' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 127).

It is precisely this shared identity which mitigates against the individual as subject and inhibits the Imaginary. Sami-Ali's definition of the Imaginary as the function of projection, whereby the subjective is made objective, is, I contend, exactly the function by which anthropological place is formed, that is to say 'à travers les connivences du langage, les repères du paysage, les règles non formulées du savoir-vivre' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 127). If subjectivity does not intervene in non-place, nor in the banal of the psychosomatic, then non-places are banal spaces.

Non-places are also banal by virtue of their formal attributes. Like the banal, which is repeated without alteration, and defined by repetition, uniformity and monotony, non-places are the same wherever we go. As Augé says: 'L'étranger égaré dans un pays qu'il

ne connaît pas [...] ne s'y retrouve que dans l'anonymat des autoroutes, des stations-service, des grandes surfaces ou des chaînes d'hôtels' (*Non-Lieux*, pp. 133–134).

It is to Toussaint's and Baker's treatment of banal space that I now wish to turn. Toussaint's characters spend a lot of time on the move, passing through a succession of locations whose identity seems interchangeable. The destinations (Paris, London, Venice, Milan, Tokyo) are mere ciphers, no more evocative than destinations on an airport departure board. The places in question are indistinguishable from the place the characters have just left – especially since these characters are for the most part content to remain in their ubiquitous hotel rooms (the anonymous non-places identified by Augé).<sup>7</sup>

These supposedly 'real' places, then, function exactly as do Augé's 'univers de reconnaissance' (*Non-Lieux*, p. 46). They consequently lend a superficially realist atmosphere to the narratives, not unlike what Roland Barthes has called an 'effet de réel': the referential illusion created by the addition of insignificant but familiar details, where what is signified is not the referent, but the category of the real itself.<sup>8</sup> As with Baudrillard, signs of the real as category replace representation of the real itself.

Toussaint also alludes to the connection between anonymity and ensuing disorientation in his description of an airport interior:

Assis sur un de ces sièges en plastique anonyme d'une immense salle de transit de l'aéroport international de Hongkong, je regardais le sol de linoléum sale entre mes jambes écartées. Pensif, les mains jointes et le corps incliné, un peu perdu et désorienté.<sup>9</sup>

7 This kind of travel recalls Marshall McLuhan's observation that the traditional purpose of travel, to encounter the unfamiliar, has reversed: 'people never really leave their beaten paths of impercipient, nor do they ever arrive at any new place. They can have Shanghai or Berlin or Venice in a package tour that they need never open.' Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 198.

8 Roland Barthes, 'L'effet de réel', in *Littérature et réalité*, ed. by Roland Barthes and others (Paris: Seuil, 1982), pp. 81–90 (p. 89).

9 Jean-Philippe Toussaint, *Autoportrait (à l'étranger)* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000), p. 17.

Toussaint's descriptions of these non-places concentrate on details which emphasise their ubiquity, details which do not singularise, but rather draw on a collective pre-existing knowledge that enables recognition. In *La Salle de bain*, the description of a hotel room in Venice is reduced to 'les notices punaisées sur la porte, les consignes de sécurité, le prix des chambres, du petit déjeuner'.<sup>10</sup> The ubiquity and recognisability of such places renders them banal according to Sami-Alì's definition.

The banal spaces in Baker's texts are of the same kind as those in Toussaint's. Apparently less generic and anonymous, because precisely located and identified by brand names, they are ultimately rendered just as ubiquitous. Baker's novel *The Fermata* opens as its narrator has just stopped time 'on the sixth floor of the MassBank building in downtown Boston', where he works as a temp.<sup>11</sup> He later visits 'the Gap clothing store in the Copley Place Mall' (where time is still frozen), removes the shirts of all the women shopping there, and spends a few hours cruising up and down the freeway.<sup>12</sup>

Further, the fostering of solitude over interaction that Augé identifies in relation to non-places is reflected in the solitary nature of both Baker's and Toussaint's characters' experiences. We find a marked avoidance of interaction and dialogue with others (in *The Fermata* this solitude is taken to extreme levels by stopping time, at which point the narrator becomes the sole consciousness in the universe). In *The Mezzanine*, the narrator relates his panic-stricken avoidance of a fellow office-worker, Bob. Each knows who the other is – we might say they inhabit a universe of recognition – but they have never been formally introduced. As Howie says: 'His face was so familiar that his ongoing status as a stranger was really an embarrassment.'<sup>13</sup> Seeing that Bob will pass him on the down escalator as Howie is about to go up, he says:

10 Jean-Philippe Toussaint, *La Salle de bain* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1985), p. 55.

11 Nicholson Baker, *The Fermata* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), p. 4.

12 Baker, *The Fermata*, p. 284.

13 Nicholson Baker, *The Mezzanine*, 3rd edn (London: Granta, 1990), p. 60. Further references to this work are given after quotations in the body of the text.

We would have to make eye contact and nod and murmur, or stonily stare into space, or pretend to inspect whatever belongings could plausibly need inspection on an escalator ride, wrenching past that second of forced proximity as if the other person did not exist. (*The Mezzanine*, p. 60)

He resolves the problem by turning away just before getting on the escalator, and walks away. In the solitude of non-place Howie adopts the role of passenger in place of interaction with others, and he is not alone.

But Baker's narrators also reappropriate and reinvest their surroundings with subjective significance. Justifying his decision to stand, rather than climb the moving escalator, Howie reflects on his role as passenger, concluding that 'it was natural, it was understandable, it was defensible to want to stand like an Easter Island monument in this trance of motorised ascension through architectures of retailing' (*The Mezzanine*, p. 102). Baker's writing operates against the uniform surface of the banal to release a cognitive and emotive charge, a fascination with an object or situation that had hitherto seemed too familiar, too uniform and universal to be remarkable. His writing thus conforms to one of Sami-Ali's characteristics of projection: 'L'existence d'un processus projectif se signale, entre autres, par un sentiment de fascination' (*Le Banal*, p. 38). The banal is transformed by the Imaginary.

This is not the end of the story. The problem with transforming the banal is that, once in the public domain, acts of subjectivity can be multiplied and reproduced, so that they risk conversion back into the banal. As Baker says in *The Size of Thoughts*: 'It is no more common than it was before I brought it up, but it is more commonplace.'<sup>14</sup> The other paradox here is that Baker's subjective responses were, as he suggests, 'common' or unconsciously shared before he articulated them (hence the reader's recognition of his and his narrator's responses), and yet highly individual because not derived from the collective Imaginary, the banal that pre-exists the subject. Nevertheless, Baker's response to the banal, and in particular to the banality of non-place, is one of transformation into singular, subjective delight.

14 Nicholson Baker, *The Size of Thoughts: Essays and Other Lumber* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996; repr. London: Vintage, 1997), p. 19.

In contrast to Baker's excitable and verbose displays of erudition, Toussaint's style is minimalist, elliptical and detached. But Toussaint shares Baker's preoccupation with the domestic and quotidian, and with narratives notably lacking in 'events'. Moreover, Toussaint's writing seems to share some of the same features that characterise banality itself. In *Monsieur*, the central character moves into a new office, which is described in the following terms:

La pièce était spacieuse, assez haute de plafond. Une grande baie vitrée, en verre bleuté, dominait la ville. La table de travail, située à portée de main de deux armoires métalliques, identiques, comptait six tiroirs, de part et d'autre, et était recouverte d'une plaque épaisse, en verre fumé. Le fauteuil. Monsieur s'en assura négligemment, pivotait.<sup>15</sup>

The narrator's gaze here remains entirely at the surface of the objects described. The metal cupboards are no doubt not only identical to each other but to a million others in identical offices. The description as a whole is flat, neutral and precise. Subjectivity does not intervene here; the contents of Monsieur's office simply exist, possessing neither symbolic depth nor emotional charge. This same spare neutrality persists throughout Toussaint's writing. Even where Toussaint is not writing specifically about banal spaces, the presence of the banal pervades his texts, in the form of two-dimensionality. This can be seen in *La Salle de bain*, which is prefaced by Pythagoras' theorem, and where geometric patterns in the form of bathroom tiles and Mondrian paintings recur throughout. Such shapes reappear throughout the text, while the narrator is shaving, for example: 'Déplaçant lentement le rasoir, je retirais des rectangles de mousse, et la peau réapparaissait dans le miroir, tendue, légèrement rougie.'<sup>16</sup> Such geometric imagery develops the novel's preoccupation with surfaces, and alludes to the depthlessness of the banal. In addition, Toussaint's novels contain the repetition of identical or near-identical passages, recalling the infinite reproducibility that Sami-Ali identifies with the banal. The hierarchy between incidental and central narrative is thoroughly subverted, by Toussaint as it is by Baker, but Toussaint's neutral, detached and

15 Jean-Philippe Toussaint, *Monsieur* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1986), p. 7.

16 Toussaint, *La Salle de bain*, p. 25.

depthless treatment of banal space might be said to be in direct opposition to Baker's approach. It seems to mimic exactly Sami-Ali's conception of the banal, without any apparent transformation as with Baker.

However, in Toussaint's work too we see evidence of projection, of the Imaginary, at work. This evidence can be detected in the texts' awareness of their status as texts. Toussaint's texts demonstrate this awareness in a number of ways: they exhibit signs of the historical process that has brought them into existence, through the use of citation and intertextual allusion. They draw the reader's attention to their artificial, constructed status, whether through the recurring use of 'en réalité' in *La Réticence*, their imperfectly repetitive structures or the self-consciousness of characters: in *La Réticence*, the narrator becomes increasingly paranoid and convinced that he is being stalked and controlled by an absent author, who is arguably Toussaint himself.<sup>17</sup>

Baker's texts are no less aware of their own creation. *U and I: A True Story* concerns the difficulties inherent in writing something new, difficulties ranging from unintended plagiarism to the desire to avoid vocabulary one has already used – what Baker calls his 'cribbled little circle of favoured freaks'.<sup>18</sup> *The Fermata* is both the central character's autobiography and a record of his attempts to write that autobiography, as well as of his forays into erotic writing, or 'rot' as he terms it. The non-fictional collection *The Size of Thoughts* contains both a long essay on the origins of the word 'lumber' and also the manner in which Baker conducted his research for that same essay. In Sami-Ali's terms, these texts interrogate their own 'becoming'. The banal, however, is 'soustrait au devenir' (*Le Banal*, p. 24).

To conclude, then, Sami-Ali's psychoanalytic theory of the banal as repression of subjectivity and Augé's anthropology of non-places can be combined to suggest that certain kinds of spaces are banal. The effect of these places on us as subjects is a key focus for Toussaint and Baker, and they each have strategies for negotiating these spaces. For

17 Jean-Philippe Toussaint, *La Réticence* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991), pp. 87, 112, 128.

18 Nicholson Baker, *U and I: A True Story*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn (London: Granta, 1992), p. 80.

Baker, that strategy involves reappropriation, reinvestment, and a joyful insistence on the power of the Imaginary to encroach on areas where the banal seems to dominate. For Toussaint, the self-aware incorporation of the banal both formally and thematically ultimately counteracts its deadening effects. And it is this awareness, this solicitation of the subject, that provokes the function of the Imaginary in ourselves.

### Suggested Reading

- Augé, Marc, *Non-Lieux, Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité* (Paris: Seuil, 1992)  
 Baker, Nicholson, *The Fermata* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994)  
 Baker, Nicholson, *The Mezzanine* 3rd edn (London: Granta, 1990)  
 Baker, Nicholson, *Room Temperature*, 2nd edn (London: Granta, 1991)  
 Baker, Nicholson, *The Size of Thoughts: Essays and Other Lumber* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996; repr. London: Vintage, 1997)  
 Perec, Georges, *L'Infra-ordinaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1989)  
 Sami-Ali, Mahmoud, *Le Banal* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980)  
 Schoots, Fieke, *Passer en douce à la douane: l'écriture minimaliste de Minuit* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997)  
 Toussaint, Jean-Philippe, *L'Appareil-photo* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1988)  
 Toussaint, Jean-Philippe, *Autoportrait (à l'étranger)* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000)  
 Toussaint, Jean-Philippe, *Faire l'amour* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2002)  
 Toussaint, Jean-Philippe, *La Salle de bain* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1985)



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