Introduction

"We never know them well, do we?"

"Who?"

"Real people."

"What do you mean, 'real people'?"

"As opposed to people in books," Paola explained. "They're the only ones we ever really know well, or know truly. . . . Maybe that's because they're the only ones about whom we get reliable information. . . . Narrators never lie." – Donna Leon, *A Sea of Troubles*

1. Background

Fictional Minds is about "people in books." In particular, it is about the amount, range, variety, and reliability of the information on the fictional minds of people in books that we are able to obtain from those books.

A little personal history may be helpful here in order to explain the purpose of this book. I began studying fictional minds in 1995. I did this by looking at the Box Hill chapter in Jane Austen's *Emma* and the Waterloo ball chapter in William Makepeace Thackeray's *Vanity Fair* to see how the minds of the characters in those chapters were constructed. I chose those two texts because I thought that it would be interesting to examine the consciousnesses of characters interacting in groups. At that time, I am ashamed to say now, I was not even aware of the existence of narrative theory, or narratology, although as it happened this direct approach to primary texts turned out to be an absolutely inspired idea. Then once I had discovered that there was such a thing as narrative theory, I thought that it would be interesting to find out what it said about my chosen area of study. After all what could be more central to the theoretical analysis of fiction than the workings of characters' minds? My first encounter with narrative theory was with what I will call the *speech category approach*, and I was immediately struck by the fact that it did not provide a convincing explanation or even description of how the whole minds of characters in action were constructed. It seemed to

me that there was a good deal that was going on in the Austen and Thackeray chapters that had not been captured by classification of the specific examples of direct access to fictional minds into the various speech categories. I felt as though I had stumbled into a large, fascinating field that I very much wanted to explore further. A small corner of it had been tended and retended with, perhaps, obsessive care, while the rest of it appeared to me at that time to be neglected.

I read more widely within narrative theory and soon discovered the concept of *focalization* or what used to be called *point of view*. So another small corner of the field had been cultivated. Focalization was informative, but it was still only a small part of the story. The third corner turned out to be *story analysis*—the structuralist study of the basic elements of plot structures. Next I came across *characterization* and, in particular, how the reader brings to the text preexisting cultural and literary stereotypes in order to construct satisfying patterns of behavior and convincing fictional personalities. Finally, and inexcusably late in the day, I encountered *possible-worlds theory*. This has proved very helpful indeed, although I soon found out that in certain ways it is not that well suited to the study of fictional minds. (You may have noticed that there are five corners— it is an irregularly shaped field.)

So, the corners of the field are well tended, but in the middle there remains a very large and apparently unexplored patch of land that still looks just as interesting to me today as it did at the beginning. But the oddest thing of all, as I continued my search within narrative theory for a comprehensive treatment of the whole of my area of interest, was that I found very little recognition of the fact that there *was* an area of interest at all. The various corners adjoin other fields and appear to be viewed primarily as adjuncts to those other fields: the analysis of spoken speech in the case of the speech categories; various aspects of discourse analysis in the case of focalization; intertextuality in the case of characterization; classical structuralism in the case of story analysis; and modal logic in the case of possible-worlds theory. This seemed strange to me then, and it still does now. In fact, it is this continued sense of strangeness that drives this book. Even now, I still think, Why don't other people ask themselves what aspect of literary theory could be more important than fictional minds? This study is an attempt to mark out the boundaries of the field as a well-defined subject area in its own right by linking together the previously well-trodden parts of it and by tending a few new patches of my own. I decided on the title *Fictional Minds*, instead of other possibilities such as *The Presentation of Consciousness*

in the Novel, because it sounds to me as much the name of a new subject area within narrative theory as it does the title of a single study.

I will describe my exploration of the field with the use, I am afraid, of another and final agricultural metaphor. Somewhere (I have been unable to find the exact reference) the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests that there are two ways of exploring a piece of land such as a hill. One way is to attempt to define it by establishing its boundaries with precision. In this way once you have drawn an exact line around the land in question, you can say with confidence that the hill consists of all the land within the border created by the line and whatever lies outside the boundary is something else. The other way to do it is to explore the hill by criss-crossing it from various directions. That way you get to know it intimately, and you have a fairly clear idea about what is the hill and what is not, even though you do not ever draw a precise line around it. Each method has its own kind of value, and of course they are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps he had in mind a comparison between the early working method of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the later, very different approach of the *Philosophical Investigations*. I would say that the modus operandi of *Fictional Minds* is the criss-crossing of the field, rather than the strict delineation of its exact borders, although I hope that it will become clear that the boundaries of the fictional mind in discourse extend much further than have previously been recognized.

During my studies, I discovered reader response theory, which proved to be of great value. I will pick out one specific issue here: the sheer scale of the input required from readers in constructing minds from novels. Have you ever, while rereading a novel containing a scene or a character that had a profound effect on you when you first read it, been surprised at how little there actually was to that scene or character and how few words were used to describe them? You think, Does that scene really last for only a page? Or, Does that character really only appear in only those scenes? (A particularly good example of this phenomenon is Orson Welles's Harry Lime character in the film *The Third Man*. Lime does not appear until after the best part of an hour and says almost nothing apart from the famous cuckoo-clock scene.) On rereading a scene of this sort, you find yourself surprised that your imagination, as it then was, contributed so much to flesh out the words in the text, and it can sometimes happen that your current imaginative state does not do the same. It is almost as though the text is simply the scaffolding on which you build the vivid psychological processes that stay with you for so long afterward. I recently felt this sort of disappointment

while rereading Umberto Eco's novel *The Name of the Rose*, which is ironic since he is a leading reader response theorist! It can also happen with historical narrative, as it did for me with Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou*. I find that the same sensation can also occur when someone recommends that I read an episode in a novel or see a scene in a film. I think, I am not really sure that there is enough here for me to feel that it justified the build-up that it got. There is a good deal that has been brought to this scene by the other person, and I am not sure what it is. All this is an illustration of what the narratologist Monika Fludernik refers to in the vivid phrase the "human urge to create significance" (1993, 457). What I am describing is one of those rare occasions when you are acutely aware of the creative nature of the reading process in general and the strangeness of character construction in particular. Any theory that attempts to explain this process, or a part of it, has to recognize the intense power of reader response to fictional minds.

I decided at an early stage that it would be rewarding to illuminate the study of fictional minds by making use of the insights of some of the disciplines relating to real minds. For example, I noticed right at the beginning that during my analyses of the *Emma* and *Vanity Fair* passages I was finding it difficult in a number of cases to separate out presentations of consciousness from descriptions of action, and I was aware that an illuminating perspective on this issue could be derived from the philosophy of action. (By the way, this point is a perfect illustration of the benefits of theorizing about novels before reading literary theory: the theory that I read later appeared to assume that dividing the two was entirely unproblematical, while the naïve reader that I then was could spot immediately that this was not the case.) In addition to philosophy such as the philosophy of mind as well as the philosophy of action, this book also makes use of other real-mind disciplines such as cognitive science, psychology, and psycholinguistics. I hope that the result is a rich, flexible, sensitive, and inclusive paradigm of the fictional mind that is well suited to capturing as much information as possible from fictional texts. *Fictional Minds* is an interdisciplinary project that is in a sense designed to be a source book for non-specialists of some of the ideas about the mind that are current in the various real-mind discourses. However, it is worth pointing out right from the start that a good deal of humility is required when theorizing about the mind. The relationship between knowledge and its representation in the brain was characterized by the psychologist William James (brother of the novelist Henry James) in 1890 as "the most mysterious thing in the world" (1981, 216). And for every mystery that has been dispelled since James's time, three more seem to arise to take its place.

One particular aspect of my approach is worth emphasizing here. The entry by Colwyn Trevarthen in *The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences* (1999) (from now on referred to as MITECS) on the topic of intersubjectivity describes two different perspectives on the mind: the *subjective first* and the *intersubjective first*.

The Western philosophical tradition (as exemplified by René Descartes and Immanuel Kant) generally assumes that human minds are inherently separate in their purposes and experiences, seeking rational clarity, autonomous skills, and self-betterment. . . . [People] construct an awareness of the self in society but remain single subjectivities. . . . We will call this view of intelligent and civilized cooperation as an artificial acquisition the . . . "subjective first" position. . . .

A different conception of human consciousness . . . perceives interpersonal awareness, cooperative action in society, and cultural learning as manifestations of innate motives for sympathy in purposes, interests, and feelings—that is, that a human mind is equipped with needs for dialogue [and] intermental engagement with other similar minds. . . . We will call this view of how human cooperation arises the . . . "intersubjective first" position. (1999, 417)

Mine is very much an intersubjective first approach to fictional minds, but not because I deny the importance of the subjective first approach. It is important to stress that both perspectives are equally valid, informative, and, indeed, necessary. The reason why this study favors the intersubjective first approach is that the subjective first position has become the dominant paradigm for the study of consciousness within narrative theory, and the bias contained in this book is intended to redress the balance a little. For a contrasting and very subjective first approach to the relationship between the novel, narrative theory, and cognitive science, see *Consciousness and the Novel* (2002) by the narrative theorist and novelist David Lodge.

It is probably the case that anyone working in the field of narrative theory has a working definition of narrative that they may make explicit or that may remain implicit. To make things easier for you, I will now make mine explicit. My thesis is a fundamental one: narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning. I state my thesis here in this bald, stark manner for purposes of clarity. The full implications of it will emerge later on. If I am right, then it follows that the study of the novel is the study of fictional mental functioning and also that the task of theorists is to make explicit the various means by which this phenomenon is studied and analyzed. This is another way

of making the point made earlier that the study of fictional minds should be established as a clearly defined and discrete subject area within literary theory.

I do not know how many narrative theorists will agree or disagree with my claim regarding the centrality of fictional minds to any informative definition of fictionality, although I refer to some potential skepticism in the next section. I hope that it will strike some as obviously true, even though I am aware that the world is full of people who have advanced theories that they thought were obviously true but then found to their astonishment that they were bitterly contested. But, true or not, and obvious or not, I am not aware that it has been explicitly formulated before, with the possible exception of Monika Fludernik's emphasis on her notion of *experientiality* in *Towards a "Natural" Narratology* (1996). My thesis has always been implicit in discussions of fictionality, and should be made explicit. As the narratologist Dorrit Cohn points out, in narratology, "as elsewhere, norms have a way of remaining uninteresting, often even invisible, until and unless we find that they have been broken—or want to show that they have not been broken" (1999, 43). The description of fictional mental functioning has been regarded as an uninteresting and even invisible norm within narratology, and it would be of benefit to the discipline if it were given the central place within the conceptual framework of the subject that it deserves.

Some scholars in other disciplines tend to regard literary theory as arid, willfully obscure, solipsistic, dreary, stultifying, and literature-hating. The list is discouragingly long. Whether or not this view is true of literary theory generally, as a picture specifically of narrative theory, it is completely misguided. It takes no account of the very large body of thorough, illuminating, and exciting work that is simply the result of systematic and rigorous analyses of narrative texts. However, all literary theorists, including narrative theorists, have a responsibility to reach out to the rest of the academic world by making literary theory as reader-friendly as possible. Literary theory should speak to, and be shared with, other scholars. Although this study is aimed primarily at specialists in literary theory in general and narrative theory in particular, it also tries to be genuinely helpful to scholars in other fields, for example, researchers into and teachers and students of English and other literatures. I believe that the interdisciplinary reconceptualization that is explored here will be of real value not only to research in fields that involve the practical criticism of fictional texts but also to the teaching of practical criticism. Such criticism depends on the ability to use the available evidence to pronounce with confidence on characters' thought processes. My work is concerned with examining precisely how this ability is

made possible. The sort of questioning that I have in mind could occur not only in courses on literary theory but also within sessions of practical criticism. In this way, I suggest, theory and practice could genuinely interpenetrate and synergistically enrich one another. I am aware that this approach does not appear to fit easily within current literary-studies approaches, but is it such a bad thing for a discipline to question some of the foundations on which it is based? Surely literature studies would gain new insights from a perspective that is both radically innovative and also directly relevant to all other perspectives on the novel.

In 1981, when reviewing Dorrit Cohn's brilliant work on thought representation *Transparent Minds* (1978), the narratologist Brian McHale commented that the "history of our poetics of prose is essentially a history of successive differentiations of types of discourse from the undifferentiated 'block' of narrative prose." He then added that "there is still a sizeable block of undifferentiated prose left" (1981, 185). In my view, no one has yet responded to McHale's challenge, and a good deal more work is required before the "sizeable block of undifferentiated prose" that is related to characters' minds is reduced any further. As far as I know, Cohn's is still the only full-length study devoted solely to this topic. All the other full-length studies of which I am aware refer to speech as well as thought or are concerned with narratology generally. It is now a long time since Cohn wrote her pioneering work and since McHale wrote his wholly justified praise of it, and yet there has been no successor in the sense that there has been no other book wholly devoted to her subject. Given the obvious importance of this issue for any formal study of the novel, this seems extraordinary. The purpose of *Fictional Minds* is to begin the attempt to theorize a part of the block of prose that remains undifferentiated: the aspect of narrative fiction that is concerned with the whole of the social mind in action.

This enterprise is intended to fit comfortably within the perspective on narrative that is offered by the Frontiers of Narrative series. The editor of the series, the narrative theorist David Herman, in advocating an approach that he calls *postclassical narratology*, contends that we have recently witnessed "a small but unmistakable explosion of activity in the field of narrative studies; signs of this minor narratological renaissance include the publication of a spate of articles, special issues, and books that rethink and recontextualize classical models for narratological research" (1999a, 1). He also remarks that postclassical narratology is "marked by a profusion of new methodologies and research hypotheses; the result is a host of new perspectives on the forms and functions of narrative itself" (1999a, 2–3). The narratologist Gerald Prince agrees with Herman that

"the very domain of narratology is (and has been) in flux" and "the discipline keeps on changing as its boundaries are (re)drawn" (1996, 160). Herman also makes the heady claim that recent work in narrative theory has "displaced and transformed the assumptions, methods, and goals of structuralist narratology" (1999a, 2) and that this research has "highlighted aspects of narrative discourse that classical narratology either failed or chose not to explore" (1999a, 2). This is precisely what *Fictional Minds* attempts to do. It does so by using concepts and ideas drawn from a variety of different disciplines because, as Herman says, postclassical narratology is an "inherently interdisciplinary project" (1999a, 20).

My argument lays great stress on the need to examine how fictional minds work within the contexts of the storyworlds to which they belong. Postclassical narratology's attempt to break free from the structuralist purity of classical narratology is also concerned with the question of context. For example, Gerald Prince, in considering the role of gender in narratology, maintains that narrative poetics "ought to be more sensitive to the role of context . . . in the production of narrative meaning" (1996, 163). Prince has in mind the various real-world, sociocultural contexts in which narratives are produced. However, I will use the notion of context in a more narrow sense to focus on both the context of the whole fictional mind during the analysis of a particular part of that mind and also on the social and physical context of the storyworld within which that mind functions.

The following passage illustrates the kind of fictional mental functioning that I am interested in. In it a policeman is confronting a suspect:

> Brunetti watched as Murino absorbed this information, then waited as the other man began to consider what his visible response should be. All of this took only seconds, but Brunetti had been observing the process for decades and was familiar with it. The people to whom he presented himself had a drawer of responses which they thought appropriate, and part of his job was to watch them as they sifted through them one at a time, seeking the right fit. Surprise? Fear? Innocence? Curiosity? He watched Murino flip through them, studied his face as he considered, then discarded various possibilities. He decided, apparently, on the last.
> "Yes? And what would you like to know, Commissario?" (Leon 1996, 199)

At this point, I will simply say that, for the reasons set out in chapters 2 and 3, current narratological approaches do not do a great deal to bring out the full significance of this passage. I will refer to it again at the end of chapter 7, by which time I hope that, when you read it there in the light of chapters 4

to 7, much more of its significance will have been revealed. Of course, there is nothing to stop you going straight there now except possibly the feeling that you might have missed some interesting stuff along the way!

2. Summary

This summary of the argument of the book is placed here to assist readers who wish to read the rest of the book and who will find it helpful to see from the beginning the purpose of the theoretical groundwork that is laid in later chapters, readers who are not yet sure whether or not they wish to read the rest of the book and may find a summary of the argument helpful in deciding, and readers who are sure that they will not read the rest of the book but who will want to know what they are missing.

What do we mean when we talk about the presentation of consciousness in fiction? It is clear what Dorrit Cohn has in mind when she refers to her "predilection for novels with thoughtful characters and scenes of self-communion" (1978, v) and her interest in "moments of lonely self-communion minutely tracing spiritual and emotional conflicts" (1999, 84). And, as I will suggest in chapter 3, her liking for private and heavily introspective thinking is shared by other narrative theorists. Self-communings lend themselves to the highly verbalized, self-conscious form of thought that is known as *inner speech*, and the theoretical predilection for fictional introspection is accompanied by a decided preference for this form of thought. As the eminent narratologist Gerard Genette has argued in *Narrative Discourse* (1980), the "novelistic convention, perhaps truthful in this case, is that thoughts and feelings are no different from speech, except when the narrator undertakes to condense them into events and to relate them as such" (1980, 171). Examples of self-communing characters who are popular with narrative theorists include Dorothea Brooke in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*; Isobel Archer in Henry James's *Portrait of a Lady*; Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom, and Molly Bloom in James Joyce's *Ulysses*; and Mrs. Ramsay in Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*.

This emphasis on the privacy of thought explains why it is customary in studies of this sort to refer to the basic reality of our lives that we do not have direct access to the thoughts of others. R. D. Laing put the point memorably: "*your experience of me is invisible to me and my experience of you is invisible to you. I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience my experience. We are both invisible men. All men are invisible to one another*" (1967, 16, quoted in Iser 1978, 165). In contrast, the vast majority of novels present directly to readers their main characters' thoughts, and we have learned to accept this as

perfectly natural. One of the pleasures of reading novels is the enjoyment of being told what a variety of fictional people are thinking. As Paola explains in the epigraph for this chapter, we get "reliable information." This is a relief from the business of real life, much of which requires the ability to decode accurately the behavior of others. It is worth dwelling on the strangeness of this activity for a moment. In one sense to read "she felt happy" is the most natural thing in the world: we know what it is to feel happy. In another sense, it is the oddest: we do not know and can never know what it is to experience directly how another person can feel happy. The literary critic Georges Poulet captures the peculiar quality of reading about the thoughts of others in this way: "Because of the strange invasion of my person by the thoughts of another, I am a self who is granted the experience of thinking thoughts foreign to him. I am the subject of thoughts other than my own. My consciousness behaves as though it were the consciousness of another" (1969, 56).

But how does this intensely private, individualistic view of the mind account for the following scene in the sit-com *Friends*? One friend, Phoebe, lets slip to another, Rachel, that all the other friends think that she, Rachel, is still in love with Ross. Rachel protests that this is not true and that she is over him, but then eventually agrees that yes, all right, she *is* still in love with him. "But why didn't you tell me?" Rachel demands to know. "Because we thought you knew!" exclaims Phoebe. What this exchange appears to show is that Rachel's feelings about Ross were more accessible to the other friends than they were to her. They all knew that she was still in love with Ross even though she herself did not know. On the other hand, we should not go too far in this direction because the conversation also shows that the knowledge that people have of the inner states of others can be patchy. Rachel did not know that the other friends knew, and the others did not know that Rachel did not know! In a sense, the humor in this scene is a new take on the familiar, clichéd old joke about the two psychiatrists (or the two behaviorists, depending on your prejudice) who say to each other when meeting, "You're fine, how am I?" However, the *Friends* scene is more interesting, it seems to me, for two reasons: it acknowledges that all of us, not just specialists in the study of the mind, have some sort of access to the thinking of others; and it also acknowledges that thought can be private and inaccessible as well as public and shared.

So, what would happen to the narratological study of private and introspective fictional minds if we applied to it some of the various discourses on real minds? Well, the philosopher Gilbert Ryle suggests that to "talk of a person's mind is . . . to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and

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undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world" (1963, 190). This is an alternative picture that consists of the social mind in action while engaged in purposive mental functioning in a physical context. Other disciplines share this view of the mind. Within anthropology, Clifford Geertz argues that "thought is consummately social: social in its origins, social in its functions, social in its forms, social in its applications. At base, thinking is a public activity—its natural habitat is the houseyard, the marketplace, and the town square" (1993, 360). Another anthropologist, Gregory Bateson, discusses the extent of the individual mind in these vivid terms: "Suppose I am a blind man, and I use a stick. I go tap, tap, tap. Where do *I* start? Is my mental system bounded at the handle of the stick? Is it bounded by my skin? Does it start halfway up the stick? Does it start at the tip of the stick? But these are nonsense questions. The stick is a pathway along which transforms of difference are being transmitted. The way to delineate the system is to draw the limiting line in such a way that you do not cut any of these pathways in ways which leave things inexplicable" (1972, 465). These views lead the psycholinguist James Wertsch to remark in *Voices of the Mind* that, "to borrow from theorists such as Gregory Bateson . . . and Clifford Geertz . . . mind is viewed here as something that 'extends beyond the skin'" (1991, 14).

This social perspective on what might be termed the *mind beyond the skin* shows that the strangeness of the device of direct access should not allow us to forget that the reader's experience of the minds of characters in novels does not depend solely on that device. Just as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from their behavior and speech, so the reader infers the workings of fictional minds and sees these minds in action from observation of characters' behavior and speech. In one sense, as Laing says, we are invisible to each other. But in another sense the workings of our minds are perfectly visible to others in our actions, and the workings of fictional minds are perfectly visible to readers from characters' actions. Most novels contain a wide variety of evidence on which readers base their conjectures, hypotheses, and opinions about fictional minds.

This study suggests that narrative theory has been concerned for too long primarily with the privacy of consciousness and that an emphasis on the social nature of thought might form an informative and suggestive perspective on fictional minds. Reduced to the very minimum, a character is simply a collection of the words that relate to a particular proper name occurring at intervals within the long series of words that makes up a narrative. The perspective that I am advocating might help provide the beginning of an answer to questions

like these: How precisely do these groups of words become the recognizable fictional minds that are clearly contained in fictional texts? Narratives are about the minds of characters, but how are these minds constructed by the narrator and the reader of the text? Obviously these are huge questions that a single study of this sort cannot hope to answer. Instead, I will focus in particular on some of the areas of fictional mental functioning that have not been explored within narratology. In doing so, I will work within the possible-worlds framework that is explained in chapter 2, section 2. A leading possible-worlds theorist, Lubomír Doležel, asserts that from "the viewpoint of the reader, the fictional text can be characterized as a set of instructions according to which the fictional world is to be recovered and reassembled" (1988, 489). My argument is that we need to look more closely at the sets of instructions that relate to mental functioning in fictional texts.

Fictional Minds argues that the constructions of the minds of fictional characters by narrators and readers are central to our understanding of how novels work because, in essence, narrative is the description of fictional mental functioning. However, narratology has neglected the whole minds of fictional characters in action. At first sight, this may seem to be an implausible claim. Surely characters' minds are considered within a number of the subject areas that make up narrative theory? For example: the study of how narrators give readers direct access to characters' thoughts (the speech category approach); the analysis of the structure of narrative stories in which characters are considered as units or functions within the structure; the concept of focalization or point of view; and the issue of characterization, or how narrators and readers use the various sorts of knowledge of character types that are gained from real life and other novels in order to build a sense of a character's personality. My answer is that these perspectives do not add up to a complete and coherent study of all aspects of the minds of characters in novels. What is required is a holistic view of the whole of the social mind in action that avoids the fragmentation of the approaches listed earlier. It is a functional and teleological perspective that considers the purposive nature of characters' thought in terms of their motives, intentions, and resulting behavior and action. This will involve some provisional and tentative typology, but as Brian McHale observes, "we should not underestimate the usefulness of 'mere' typology. Before a phenomenon can be explained it must first exist for those who would explain it, which means that it must be constituted as a category with boundaries and a name" (1981, 185). This discussion will take us a long way from analyses of lonely introspective self-communings in terms of the speech categories. But this is just as well perhaps, as

the characters in a large number of novels are not given to intense introspection, and the narrators of many novels make little use of the speech categories of free indirect thought or direct thought that are described later.

The six chapters that are sandwiched between this introductory chapter and the concluding one can be grouped into three pairs. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with existing narratological approaches toward fictional minds, chapters 4 and 5 consider the implications of real-mind discourses for fictional minds and lay the theoretical basis for a new approach toward this area of narrative theory, and chapters 6 and 7 explore the new approach in various specific directions.

In chapter 2, "Some Narratological Approaches," I will refer to a few of the ways in which some narratological subject areas can be brought together within a new theoretical perspective and thereby contribute toward a coherent study of fictional minds. In chapter 3, "The Speech Categories," I will consider in a little more detail the problems inherent in one particular area that I have referred to several times already: the speech category approach toward fictional consciousness. I use the term *speech category approach* because the narratological analysis of characters' thought processes is based on the assumption that the categories that are applied to fictional speech can be unproblematically applied to fictional thought. The main categories, which are explained in more detail in chapter 3, section 1, are these:

- *direct thought*: The train pulled away. He thought, "Why the hell am I still waiting for her?" (When untagged and without quotes, this is *free direct thought*.)
- *thought report*: The train pulled away. He wondered why he was still waiting for her.
- *free indirect thought*: The train pulled away. Why the hell was he still waiting for her?

This approach does not give an adequate account of the form or the function of presentations by narrators to readers of fictional characters' minds. In summary, the following problems occur: It privileges the apparently mimetic categories of direct thought and free indirect thought over the diegetic category of thought report; views characters' minds as consisting primarily of a private, passive flow of consciousness because of its overestimation of the importance of inner speech; and neglects the thought report of such states of mind as emotions, sensations, dispositions, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motives, and reasons for action. I devote a separate chapter to these problems because the

speech category approach has become the dominant theoretical discourse on fictional consciousness and, therefore, it has to be addressed before I go on to build up what I hope is a richer and more informative discourse on the whole of fictional minds; because its shortcomings form an illuminating context within which the benefits of the new perspective will become clear; and because the grip of the *verbal norm* (that is, the preoccupation with inner speech) is strong and has to be loosened before the new perspective is fully understood.

The required reconceptualization of fictional minds becomes an interdisciplinary project in chapter 4 because it makes use of what I shall call the *parallel discourses* on real minds, such as cognitive science, psycholinguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of mind, in order to study what I shall variously call the *whole mind*, the *social mind*, and the *mind in action*. Real-mind discourses are invaluable here because they can be used to provide explanations that are fuller than those that are currently available within narrative theory as to how the reader can recuperate meaning from fictional texts. They are parallel discourses because they contain a very different kind of picture of consciousness from that provided by narrative theory, and as far as I know, the two pictures have not yet been brought together in quite the way in which they are here. For example, in chapter 4, "The Whole Mind," I attempt to enlarge our picture of the whole fictional mind in a number of the different directions that are suggested by real-mind discourses. These include the functionalist approach of cognitive scientists toward human mental functioning (that is, studying what thinking is for); how the views of psychologists and philosophers vary on the extent of the relationship between language and thought; the importance not only of non-verbal conscious events but also of entirely non-conscious mental states; the pivotal role of dispositions in any picture of the whole mind; the role of emotions in mental life and in particular their relationship with cognition; the lessons to be learned from the philosophy of action when considering the relationship between thought and behavior; and, finally, first-person ascription and in particular the unreliability of many self-ascriptions of motives and intentions. (Remember the *Friends* scene that was discussed earlier?)

I move the argument on in chapter 5, "The Social Mind," by considering the whole mind that is described in chapter 4 now put in its social context. I start by examining the considerable extent to which our thought is public and social in nature. I then pick up the discussion about unreliable first-person ascription at the end of chapter 4 and contrast it with the reliability of a good deal of third-person ascription (the *Friends* scene again). After a brief section on the work of Russian psycholinguists on the development of purposive thought, I

continue with the Russian tradition by focusing on the insights of the great discourse theorist Mikhail Bakhtin on the dialogicality of thought. Finally, in a section entitled "The Mind Beyond the Skin," I explore the fascinating issue of the socially situated or distributed nature of much of our cognition, action, and even identity.

The purpose of chapter 6, "The Fictional Mind," is to relate this work more specifically to the fictional mind. I begin by building on the discussion in chapter 2, section 4 of cognitive frames and narrative comprehension by applying these issues in more detail to mental action in novels. I argue that one of the key frames for comprehending texts is what I refer to as the *continuing-consciousness frame*. In other words, readers create a continuing consciousness out of the isolated passages of text that relate to a particular character. In this way, we assemble what I call an *embedded narrative*: the whole of a character's various perceptual and conceptual viewpoints, ideological worldviews, and plans for the future considered as an individual narrative that is embedded in the whole fictional text. In using this term I am following the narratologist Marie-Laure Ryan, who introduces it in an article entitled "Embedded Narratives and Tellability" (1986) and later in her book, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (1991). I then relate the embedded narrative notion to the concept of *teleology*, or the investigation of narrative in terms of its final purpose or ending. Finally, the various ideas introduced in this chapter are considered in the context of the aspectual nature of the storyworld, which is only ever viewed under particular aspects or from individual and therefore limited points of view.

In chapter 7, "The Fictional Mind in Action," I explore some of the specific implications of the general ideas that were introduced in the previous chapter. Using a number of examples from a specific text, Evelyn Waugh's *Vile Bodies*, I consider some of the subframes of the continuing-consciousness frame. One subframe concerns the relationships between fictional thought and fictional action and how these relationships are presented in fictional discourse. In particular, the term the *thought-action continuum* is introduced to draw attention to the fact that the distinction between thought and action in fictional texts is not as clear-cut as narrative theorists have assumed. Drawing on the work in chapter 5 on the social mind, I go on to discuss another subframe: the prevalence in novels of what psychologists call *intermental thought*, or shared, group, or joint thinking. In order to consider the third subframe, I introduce the term *doubly embedded narratives* in order to convey the idea that versions of characters exist within the minds of other characters and that the relationships between these versions determine to a great extent the teleology of the plot. To finish the book,

I devote the last chapter, "Further Applications," to some tentative suggestions for further historical applications of the ideas summarized earlier.

In summary, *Fictional Minds* describes a theoretical framework that considers the whole of a particular fictional mind, thereby avoiding the fragmentation referred to earlier; views characters' minds, not just in terms of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thought, but in terms of the narrator's positive linking role in presenting characters' social engaged mental functioning, particularly in the mode of thought report; analyzes in functional and teleological terms the purposive nature of characters' thought: their motives, intentions, and the resulting behavior and action; highlights the role of the reader in constructing characters' embedded narratives by means of a series of provisional conjectures and hypotheses about their mental functioning; and shows how readers read plots as the interaction of those embedded narratives.

Several of the devices that are used in the constructions of fictional minds by narrators and readers, such as the role of thought report in describing emotions and the role of behavior descriptions in conveying motivation and intention, have yet to be defamiliarized. As Hegel puts it, what is "'familiarly known' is not properly known, just for the reason that it is 'familiar'" (1931, 92). The narratologist Manfred Jahn refers in a different context to a "number of interesting cognitive mechanisms that have largely remained hidden below both the reader's and the narratologist's threshold of awareness" (1999a, 168). In my view, this number includes some of the mechanisms that produce the illusion of fictional minds. However, within the embedded narratives framework, these devices can be fully defamiliarized and thereby made more visible.

3. Some Definitions and Assumptions

Narratology and narrative theory. I will use these terms interchangeably. Some theorists distinguish between them by reserving the former term for the type of thinking about narrative that arose from the structuralist movement of the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond and by using the latter term in a much broader sense to cover all theoretical writing on the nature of narrative. However, although this distinction may seem attractive in theory, I think that it would be difficult to maintain in practice.

The narrator and the implied author. I will use the term *narrator* to describe the agency responsible for the words on the pages of fictional texts. I shall not refer to the actual author, because I am studying only the fictional texts themselves and not their historical circumstances. The other term that is used in this context, *implied author*, was made famous by the literary critic

Wayne C. Booth in *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (originally published in 1961) and further developed by a number of narratologists since. The term is defined in Gerald Prince's *Dictionary of Narratology* (1987) as "the implicit image of an author in the text, taken to be standing behind the scenes and to be responsible for its design and for the values and cultural norms it adheres to" (1987, 42). Prince explains that the narrator must be distinguished from the implied author. The former recounts the situations and events and is inscribed in the text as a teller; the latter is taken to be accountable for the selection, distribution, and combination of the events and is inferred from the text. But, Prince concedes, while the distinction is clear in the case of first-person narrators, it can be problematical in other cases (1987, 42–43). The concept of the implied author is a valid and informative way to refer to responsibility for the values and cultural norms that can plausibly be inferred from a text, subject to the caveat that different readers may infer different implied authors from the same text. However, during the discussions of a wide variety of novels that are contained in the following chapters, I have not found it possible to maintain a coherent distinction between the agency that is responsible for selecting and organizing the events (as Prince describes the role of the implied author), and the voice that recounts them (the narrator). For example, which one decides that direct access is given to the thoughts of one character and not another? Which one decides on the length and extent of access or whether it is given in direct or free indirect thought or in thought report? Which one decides on the precise degree to which the language used in the discourse explicitly or implicitly conveys the motivation of a particular character? Because I have not been able to answer these questions, I will refer only to the narrator.

Non-narrated narration. Some narratologists believe that it is possible for narration to occur without a narrator. For example, in *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* (1993), Monika Fludernik asserts that "there *can be* narration without a narrator. That is to say, in *pure* reflector mode narrative there cannot be any indication of a narrative voice" (1993, 443). (The term *reflector mode* describes a novel such as Henry James's *The Ambassadors* in which the action is reflected through the consciousness of a *reflector character.*) However, other narratologists are equally insistent that all narratives must necessarily have a narrator. For the narratologist Mieke Bal, as she explains in *Narratology* (1997), the statement "Elizabeth felt somewhat tired that day" should be read as "I narrate: . . . 'Elizabeth felt somewhat tired that day'" (1997, 25). There is a very complex and technical debate behind these two positions, and it would take me a long way out of my way to justify my belief that reflector novels such

as *The Ambassadors* contain plenty of evidence of the presence of a narrator. For this reason, I will simply say that one of the assumptions behind this book is that Bal is correct to say that all narrative has a narrator. (For more on this issue, see the highly illuminating discussion in Richard Aczel's article, "Hearing Voices in Narrative Texts" [1998].)

The reader. I refer frequently throughout this book to the reader. Here I mean what is meant by the term *implied reader*: the theoretical construct of the ideal, informed, or model reader that is implied by or can be constructed from the text. Nevertheless, I hope that my generalizations are also true to a fairly large extent of the psychological activities of real readers. After all, it is necessary to presuppose a high degree of correlation between implied and real readers in order to explain the incontrovertible fact that most fictional texts are readily understood by real readers. However, I have to own up to the fact that I have done no empirical research at all on how real readers read.

Story and discourse. This is a standard narratological distinction. As defined by Prince, the *story* is the content plane of narrative, the what of a narrative, the narrated (1987, 91). The *discourse* is the expression plane of narrative, the how of a narrative, the narrating (1987, 21). The two elements are often referred to in Russian formalist terms as the *fabula* and the *sjuzhet*. There are also many other names for this pair of concepts, but as some terms are used by different people to signify both sides of the dichotomy, I will not confuse you by listing them here. It is a problematical distinction. Many theorists have pointed out that any attempt to tell the story simply results in another discourse. It is never possible to arrive at a pure unmediated story, and each reader's story will be subtly different from every other reader's. In some cases, say *Emma*, the differences might focus on the personality of the heroine. In other cases such as Henry James's *The Turn of the Screw*, readers might differ quite substantially over what events took place in the story. Also, the literary critic Jonathan Culler (1980) makes the important point that ultimately the two concepts are entirely incompatible planes of explanation. "Emma marries Knightley because she falls in love with him" is a story explanation; "Emma marries Knightley because that is the ending that brings to a satisfactory conclusion the various themes and meanings of the novel" is a discourse explanation; and these two explanations cannot be reconciled. Finally, I have found that it can often be difficult to decide whether an issue such as the motivation for an action belongs to the story plane or the discourse plane. Nevertheless, the distinction between the events and situations in the story and the presentations of them in the words on the pages of the fictional text is a valuable one. Some narratologists use models that

contain three or even four elements, usually by splitting the discourse plane into such aspects as text, narration, and textuality. *The Fictions of Discourse* (1994) by Patrick O'Neill contains a good summary of the various models (1994, 20–21). I have added the concept of *storyworld*—see chapter 2, section 2—to the story and discourse distinction to create a three-part model.

The mind. Generally, I use the term *mind* in preference to alternatives such as *consciousness* and *thought*. The use of the latter two terms is often accompanied by a tendency to see mental life mainly in terms of inner speech. In addition, consciousness can have the implication of self-consciousness, which I want to avoid because it deflects attention from non-consciousness and latent states of mind. The important point is that the mind refers to much more than what is normally thought of as consciousness or thought. For example, it is possible to drive skillfully while thinking about something else. This is the mind in action, but it is not thought or consciousness in action. The terms *mental event* and *states of mind* are very useful. *Mental functioning* and *mental action* are particularly worthwhile for their emphasis on the functional nature of mental activity. For comments on the terms *stream of consciousness* and *interior monologue* see the next section. The inclusive use of the term *mind* embraces all aspects of our inner life: not just cognition and perception, but also dispositions, feelings, beliefs, and emotions. Of course, the term is so wide that its use can shade off into such notions as character and personality, but I regard its doing so as desirable. A range of terms, including thought and consciousness, will be used throughout the text for the sake of variety, but my paradigm term for the aggregate of mental states and events is the *mind*.

I am particularly interested in the various ways in which the interrelations between different types of thought are presented in fiction. I will anticipate my argument by mentioning a few random examples of what I have in mind. Psychologists such as Jon Elster in *Alchemies of the Mind* (1999) continually stress the interconnections between cognition and emotion and argue that in practice they are difficult if not impossible to disentangle. Cognitions tend to have a strong emotional element and vice versa. They also relate closely in causal terms: a character's anger might be caused by a cognition of some sort that in turn results in further emotions and then other cognitions. Also, both are necessary to will and motivation. Philosophers talk of actions arising from or being caused by (or however expressed) an interrelationship of desires and beliefs. "I *desire* x and I *believe* that I can achieve x by *doing* y." The philosophers John R. Searle and Daniel Dennett, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, and the psycholinguist Steven Pinker all suggest that our mental events and states, including cognitions,

come with a particular mood, tone, or color. For example, Searle refers to the "pleasure/unpleasure dimension" to all consciousness (1992, 141). Damasio stresses the "continuity of the melodic line of background emotion" (2000, 93). I am sure that an investigation of these various relationships will illuminate a good deal of fictional thought.

Embedded narratives. As explained in the previous section, a central concept in this book is one that I label *embedded narratives,* the use of which has the undeniable drawback that many theorists attach a completely different meaning to the term. Its more familiar meaning is a self-contained narrative that is embedded within a so-called *frame narrative.* For example, in *The Arabian Nights,* the stories that Sheherazade tells her husband every night are embedded within the frame narrative of her attempts to delay her threatened execution. The creation of an additional use is regrettable but, on balance, justified because the term vividly illustrates a number of the important features of fictional minds to which I wish to draw attention.

Mimesis and diegesis. These two terms are staples of literary theory, but unfortunately both contain a wide variety of meanings. Prince's dictionary reflects some of the drift in use. His long entry for the term *mimesis* (1987, 52–53) contains, in summary, these three meanings: *showing* (as opposed to telling), which is defined elsewhere in his book as "a mode characterized by the detailed, scenic rendering of situations and events and by minimal narratorial mediation" (1987, 87); the direct speech of a character; and an accurate representation of life. One problem is that these completely separate meanings— together with several others, identified, for example, by the narratologist Meir Sternberg (1982)—are often confused with each other. Another problem is that the partner term, *diegesis,* is sometimes used in opposition to mimesis and sometimes used in completely separate senses. According to Prince (1987, 20), diegesis has two meanings: *telling* (as opposed to showing), which is defined as "a mode characterized by more narratorial mediation and by a less detailed rendering of situations and events than showing" (1987, 96), and the storyworld in which the narrated situations and events occur. Obviously, the first meaning for diegesis is used in opposition to mimesis but the second is not. A further complication is that some definitions of mimesis, Moshe Ron's, for example (1981, 18) and Fludernik's (1993, 459, 463), have inflated its meaning so far that it completely encompasses the notion of diegesis. For these reasons, it seems to me that the two terms are beyond precise definition. I will use them only when other theorists commonly do. For example, narratologists regularly refer

to direct thought as the most mimetic mode of thought presentation, and thought report as the most diegetic.

4. What the Book Is Not

Occasionally you read book reviews in which the chief criticism is that the wrong book was written. Why oh why did the author not see that what the world really needs is a completely different study with, possibly, just the original title surviving? Typically, these reviews, following faint praise for the book for being so short, contain a long list of additional topics that if included would have tripled its size. Readers of these reviews often sense that the list is in effect the book that the reviewer would have liked to have written, had he or she thought of it or had the time to do it. The following section is intended to assist such a reviewer by providing a checklist of the topics that comprise the book that this is *not.* This checklist is particularly necessary as the title *Fictional Minds* is so general that it can be explored in a wide variety of very different directions.

Fiction and non-fiction. I will not be addressing the various issues relating to the definitions of and the boundaries between such categories as narrative, fiction, non-fiction, history, and the novel. Anyone interested in this fascinating topic should consult such authorities on narrative theory as Hayden White (1978, 1987), Michael McKeon (1987, 2000), Marie-Laure Ryan (1997), and Dorrit Cohn (1999). I have simply taken as a given the existence of a number of texts that are generally accepted as novels and have tried to see how they work.

Literary criticism. Literary critics are concerned with the wide variety of strategies that are used by novelists to give meaning and form to the narrative, such as the use of symbolic structures of motifs, metaphors, metonymies, and so on. They then frequently relate these symbolic structures to the historical circumstances of the novels that they are analyzing. A study of the relationship between these issues and the subject of this study would focus on the means by which narrators construct characters' embedded narratives and, therefore, in aggregate, the plot, in order to achieve these effects. It is my intention to theorize an aspect of the process of reading and not the end product. The embedded narrative approach is primarily an attempt to explore fully the workings of dense and complex fictional texts. This is the process. The end products are the various purposes to which these explorations might be put.

The historicized approach. I will not address the issue of how presentations of fictional minds have developed and changed over time. However, chapter 8 makes some suggestions about how it will be possible to historicize

the new approach. For example, put simply, the device of direct presentations of characters' minds was the subject of a fierce debate in the middle to late eighteenth century, became naturalized in the early to middle nineteenth century, was problematized toward the end of the nineteenth century, and became the subject of various sorts of experiments in the twentieth century. However, the purpose of the present study is to establish and justify my basic approach first in order to ensure that as much evidence as possible on the presentation of fictional minds has been made available before attempting to trace these sorts of historical developments. Narratives from the Bible onward presented characters' minds by means of descriptions of behavior and action, and so embedded narratives can be established purely on this basis. It is only when the roles of the reader, narrator, and character in this process have been completely understood that the development of the device of detailed direct access in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be put in its full historical context.

Reception theory. Reception theory is the attempt to "understand literary works in relation to specific readerships, reconstructing the changing expectations which condition the responses of successive generations, or of different sub-cultures at the same time" (Baldick 1996, 171). In my terms, reception theory is the study of the historical relationship between real and fictional minds or how real minds have in the past received presentations of fictional minds. This kind of study would be enriched by the theory suggested here, which could help to establish the precise means by which fictional minds have been constructed by the historical readers of particular periods.

Genres and intertextuality. Intertextuality may be defined as the sum of the myriad relationships that exist between different texts. These include adaptation, imitation, parody, as well as the less obvious relationships that have been explored by poststructuralist critics such as Julia Kristeva. Intertextual factors also include the role that readers' expectations with regard to genres such as the thriller, the romance, and the Gothic novel play in the constructions of the fictional minds that are contained within those fictional texts. In discussing briefly in chapter 2, section 3, the sensitive and imaginative analysis of intertextuality and genre by such critics as Umberto Eco in *The Role of the Reader* (1981) and Jonathan Culler in *Structuralist Poetics* (1975), I explain that in my view this vitally important perspective has been thoroughly explored and well acknowledged and that the purpose of this book is to go in some different directions.

Realism. As this book is about the relationship between real minds and fictional minds, it may appear that I am concerned with the issue of realism

in the novel. For example, you might think that I will be arguing that fictional minds are "realistic" when they are similar in some specified way to real minds and "unrealistic" when they are not. This is not the case. I am arguing that the approach proposed in this book applies to all novels, apparently realist or not. I do not distinguish between realist and non-realist texts. A reasonably plausible definition of the concept of realism would consider the extent to which a fictional discourse is consistent with the dominant scientific and other knowledge-based discourses at the time of writing and at the time of reading. However, the issue of consistency is not one that I will be exploring here as it implies that the real-life discourses are to be regarded as the norm from which fictional-mind discourses may or may not deviate. My way of working is the other way round: as far as fictional minds are concerned, I regard fictional discourses as the norm, and I then investigate whether or not the use of real-mind discourses can illuminate our study of them. In my view real-mind discourses assist the study of such non-realist texts as the postmodernist novel and fantasy fiction just as much as the realist novel. It may appear that I am predisposed to realist fiction because, as it happens, most of my examples belong in that category. However, this is not significant as I am concentrating on canonical novels that just happen to be realist texts. See the next section for more on this point.

The unconscious. In chapter 4, section 4 I consider the non-conscious activities of the mind, but I say very little there about the *unconscious*, the central concept of Freudian psychoanalytical theory. This may seem surprising. One reason for the omission is that, as explained in the opening section, I see this book as a counterweight to the current biases in narrative theory, and as psychoanalytical approaches are well established within the theory, there is no pressing need for further comment here. The other reason is that I am personally quite skeptical of Freudianism and have always found it puzzling that a school of thought could become so well established on the basis of so little empirical evidence. However, to have argued this viewpoint would have been a distraction from the main purpose of the book, and so it seemed best simply to put the question to one side.

Stream of consciousness and interior monologue. I suppose these two terms might be the most surprising omissions. How can a book about consciousness in fiction have so little to say about them? The answer is simple: like mimesis and diegesis, they are beyond precise definition. Although the two terms have different origins, they have now become inextricably linked. *Stream of consciousness* was first used in 1890 by William James in *Principles of*

Psychology. It is thought that *interior monologue* was probably initially used to describe *Ulysses*. Interestingly, although the formal or theoretical definitions for these terms vary widely, the ostensive or practical definitions are very precise. That is to say, apart from occasional references to earlier novelists (for example, Edouard Dujardin), theorists define the two phrases in relation to the modernist novels of Joyce, Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner, and Dorothy Richardson. The examples used to illustrate the terms are invariably taken from *Ulysses* or, less often, from Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* or *Mrs. Dalloway*.

Some of the theoretical definitions describe the types of fictional thought that occur in the minds of characters in the story. Although most emphasize the random, associative, illogical, and seemingly ungrammatical free flow of thought, others mention more controlled and directed thought; non-conscious, but also conscious thought; verbal, but also non-verbal thought. Some specify cognition only, while others include various combinations of cognition, perception, sensations, and emotions. Confusingly though, other theoretical definitions refer to a completely separate issue: the techniques of thought and consciousness presentation in the discourse. Most of these definitions stress an apparently unmediated presentation in the mode of free direct thought. However, this can be misleading. Many illustrative passages contain a dense mixture, often in equal proportions, of surface description of the physical storyworld together with all three modes of thought presentation: thought report, free indirect thought, and direct thought. For example: "Made him feel a bit peckish. [thought report] The coals were reddening. [surface description] Another slice of bread and butter: three, four: right. [free direct thought] She didn't like her plate full [free indirect thought]" (Joyce 1986, 45).

To add to the confusion, there is no clear consensus on the relationship between the two terms. Some theorists use the terms interchangeably. Others regard one as a particular type or subset of the other. Some attach different and separate meanings to each. Perhaps the most common distinction is this: Stream of consciousness describes the thought itself and/or the presentation of thought in the sort of third-person passage that I have just quoted and that is characteristic of Woolf and the early episodes in *Ulysses*. Interior monologue describes the long continuous first-person passages or whole texts that contain uninterrupted, unmediated free direct thought such as "Penelope" (Molly Bloom's famous monologue in the last episode of *Ulysses*) or the first three sections of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*. For example: "I suppose she was pious because no man would look at her twice I hope Ill never be like her a wonder she didnt want us to cover our faces" (Joyce 1986, 608).

Some writers, after commenting on the regrettable confusion, give firm advice about how the two terms should be used in the future. As these suggestions invariably go unheeded, the advice that I would otherwise have been tempted to give (do not use the two terms at all) will not be given.

5. A Note on the Texts

As my interest is solely in narrative fiction, all of my primary sources are novels. I will not be considering formal non-fiction narratives such as histories, biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs, or informal or natural narratives such as spoken life histories, testimonies, conversation, stories, and jokes. Narrative has become a very fashionable heuristic tool within such social sciences as sociology, cultural studies, and anthropology, and I would be very excited if my conclusions were of interest to scholars working in these fields, but, as I say, my focus is on fiction.

I have tried to make use of a wide range of canonical novels written in English from Aphra Behn to Thomas Pynchon. My claim, right or wrong, is that the aspect of the reading process with which I am concerned is fundamental to all narrative fiction. In talking about narrative as the description of fictional mental functioning, I may sound as though I am talking about the *consciousness novel* of Henry James or the stream of consciousness or interior monologue novels described earlier. But nothing could be further from the truth. I am talking about the novel as a whole because all novels include a balance of behavior description and internal analysis of characters' minds. In addition to the canon, I have made good use of thrillers. I read thrillers because I enjoy them. But I find that I cannot follow the plot of a thriller unless I have a fairly clear conception of the mental functioning of the main characters (who knows what and who is trying to achieve what at any given point in the story). It is this operation of attempting to follow the lines of their thinking that enables me to follow the logic of their actions and, therefore, the twists and turns of the plot.

In general, I will concentrate on third-person novels and will pay much less attention to first-person novels. That is to say, my priority is the *heterodiegetic narrator* (one who is not a character in the story being narrated) and not the *homodiegetic narrator* (one who is a character in the story being narrated). There are various complexities inherent in this apparently simple distinction. It is well known that some heterodiegetic narrators of third-person novels (the famous example is Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones*) do not let the fact that they are not participants in the storyworld inhibit them from making liberal use of the "I" pronoun when letting us have their views on a wide variety of

subjects. Conversely, some homodiegetic narrators of first-person novels (such as Anthony Powell's *A Dance to the Music of Time* series) are so unobtrusive that there is frequently very little use of the "I" pronoun for long stretches of text. It is equally well known that there are always two first persons in any homodiegetic narrative: the one who experiences the events and the one who later recounts them. The Pip who is the narrator of Charles Dickens's *Great Expectations* is much older and wiser than the Pip who experiences the events. Other complexities include a first-person narrator disappearing and being replaced by a third-person narrator (as in Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*). Although, as I say, I discuss very few first-person novels, I think that it is quite likely that my approach will prove to be as well suited to them as to third-person novels. In particular, the variety of evidence that is available for the construction of character (action and behavior as well as direct access to thoughts) would explain how first-person narrators construct other characters. For example, it would show how both the older and the younger Pip differently construct the character of Joe despite neither having direct access to his thoughts.

In addition to the primary texts, a word of explanation is also required for the secondary texts. There has been a truly vast amount of work done on real minds in such fields as cognitive science, philosophy, psychology, and psycholinguistics. It would not be possible for a single work to do justice to it all. Any selection of the vast source material available in these fields is bound to be arbitrary. A large number of books could be written on my subject without any overlap at all in the choice of real-mind studies. You may finish this book saying, "Why on earth didn't he mention x or y?" (add name of philosopher, psychologist, or cognitive scientist of choice). If you do, my initial position is that I am referring to real-mind discourses only in so far as they are able to illuminate fictional minds and that the two phenomena, real minds and fictional minds, are very different things. My fall-back position is the Dr. Johnson defense: When asked by a woman of his acquaintance why he had incorrectly defined the word pastern as the knee of a horse, he replied: "Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance!"

Finally, I should add that I have made extensive use of MITECS, the encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences that I referred to earlier. It is an invaluable sourcebook, and I recommend it strongly—it is much less intimidating than it sounds!

Conclusion

In *Unspeakable Sentences* (1982), the narrative theorist Ann Banfield declares that "the language of narrative has the resources for a picture of the activities

and states of the mind commensurate with the most sophisticated theories of knowledge and consciousness" (1982, 210). I believe that she is right. However, I also think that our theories about the presentations of the pictures of the activities and states of the mind that are contained in narrative fiction need to become more sophisticated than at present if they are to reflect the richness and complexity of current theories of knowledge and consciousness.