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Introduction: Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Narrative Theory

James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz

Writing an introduction to a wide-ranging collection of essays is always a matter of navigating between Scylla and Charybdis – but in this book, the metaphor has more specificity than usual. Scylla, you'll recall, was a monster who inhabited a cave in a cliff on a spit of land jutting off from the coast; her many arms plucked sailors from the boats that came too near. Charybdis was a whirlpool that threatened any boats that tried to evade the cliff. Elements of those images impinge on this introduction – and on narrative theory itself – in several ways.

How, for instance, should the introduction be structured? On the one hand, we can aim for clarity, simply summarizing the contents. Such a *Cliffs Notes* approach may provide a certain stony intelligibility, but it runs the risk of plucking the spirit from both the essays and our readers. On the other hand, we're faced with the ever-expanding whirlpool of self-reflexivity. An introduction, after all, can itself easily become a narrative – and a narrative about the current study of narrative (which in turn includes a history of the study of narrative) risks spinning into an endless loop, especially when written by authors who are, by disciplinary training, acutely self-conscious.

The task is made more difficult still because Scylla and Charybdis are not simply potential dangers to be evaded. Like the Sirens (and it's appropriate that the volume includes three essays on music and one that deals tangentially with musical issues), they offer seductions as well. Indeed, one can argue that the discipline of narrative theory itself divides into two attractive and productive ways of doing things, ways parallel to the distinction between the cliff and the whirlpool. On the one hand, we have the search for a stable landing, a theoretical bedrock of the fundamental and unchanging principles on which narratives are built. This approach is often associated with what is called structuralist (or classical) narratology, and especially after the rise

believed to yank the life out of the works it considers. But as we hope this collection will make clear, it's still an enormously vital area of study, and it's still producing illuminating work, though nowadays its claims tend to be more modest – about “most narratives” or “narratives of a certain historical period” rather than about “all narratives.”

On the other hand, we have a discipline experiencing a voracious spin. That whirlpool is generated in part by the self-conscious and self-critical nature of much narrative theory. What the two of us have in the past labeled “theorypractice,” for instance, uses the interpretive consequences of particular theoretical hypotheses as a way of testing and re-examining those very hypotheses. But the vortex of narrative theory comes as well from what's often called the “narrative turn,” the tendency of the term “narrative” to cover a wider and wider territory, taking in (some would say “sucking in”) an ever-broadening range of subjects for inquiry. Narrative theory, over the years, has become increasingly concerned with historical, political, and ethical questions. At the same time, it has moved from its initial home in literary studies to take in examination of other media (including film, music, and painting) and other nonliterary fields (for instance, law and medicine).

It should therefore be no surprise that our volume represents both Scylla and Charybdis, both the search for enduring fundamentals of narrative theory and the engagement with the many turnings of contemporary theory. True, the introduction steers, on the whole, closer to the cliff, largely because so many of the essays themselves offer sufficient spin to satisfy anyone in search of the pleasures of the whirlpool. Nonetheless, we are sufficiently self-conscious to warn you that, if writing this introduction involved navigating a familiar but tricky path, so too does reading it. For reasons that will become increasingly clear, we urge you to recognize that our navigational choices were not inevitable. You very well might have charted a different route – though of course you can't choose that route until you've read much more than this introduction.

The book opens with a prologue that sets out narrative theory's modern history. In the first essay, “Histories of Narrative Theory (I): A Genealogy of Early Developments,” David Herman surveys the origins of the field. But since Herman is strongly influenced by the notion of “genealogy” promoted by Nietzsche and Foucault, his essay refuses to move in a simple linear fashion. He is particularly concerned with the way early structuralist narratology – an attempt to study narrative by treating “particular stories as individual narrative messages supported by a shared semiotic system” – grew out of “a complex interplay of intellectual traditions, critico-theoretical movements, and analytic paradigms distributed across decades, continents, nations, schools of thought, and individual researchers.” Herman uses Wellek and Warren's influential *Theory of Literature* as a nodal point, moving in and out from there to show the overlapping connections among a wide range of superficially competing critics who nonetheless represent, if not “a singular continuous tradition of research,”

Herman's key points is that what can be assimilated from any theorist's work at any given time is fundamentally dependent on the paradigms in force at the time of reading. His history thus twists back on itself, as he demonstrates how “old” theoretical works in “new” contexts take on new resonances.

In “Histories of Narrative Theory (II): From Structuralism to the Present,” Monika Fludernik likewise resists a linear chronology in which gradual developments contribute to an ever-more complete critical arsenal. Rather, Fludernik self-reflexively applies narrative theory to the history of narrative theory itself, setting out two competing “plots.” She then follows the second of these to show how narrative theory has spread out in widening branches. Specifically, she moves from formalist study to pragmatics (including issues of gender and politics) on to the study of media and of the narrative turn in a variety of social sciences, coming finally to issues of linguistics and cognition. Her essay dexterously ends with both a return to its opening and a possible glimpse of the future.

The prologue ends with Brian McHale's “Ghosts and Monsters: On the (Im)Possibility of Narrating the History of Narrative Theory.” Here McHale questions the work of Herman and Fludernik by using the insights of narrative theory to question the task we assigned to them. Specifically, McHale defines two different kinds of history – what he calls “history of ideas” and “institutional history” – and argues that the friction between them makes a true history of narrative theory an impossibility. In even more provocative terms, McHale suggests that there is an irreconcilable opposition between narrative theory that privileges “structure” (the Scylla of classical narratology) and narrative theory that privileges “history” (the Charybdis of narrative turnings). Though the necessity of sequence dictates that McHale's essay be last in the prologue, that does not mean that you should take his word as final. Our own position is that the prologue is a provocation that opens up more questions than it settles.

Part I, “New Light on Stubborn Problems,” looks at some of the disputes that have continued as an undertow in the flow of narrative theory for the past 40 or 50 years – disputes that therefore remain central to its continued movement. In the first essay, “Resurrection of the Implied Author: Why Bother?,” Wayne C. Booth – already introduced in Herman's and Fludernik's histories – returns to a concept that he first introduced in *The Rhetoric of Fiction* in 1961: the implied author, the author's “second self” as reflected in a text. Many subsequent theorists (including several contributors to this volume) have argued that the concept is either useless or redundant; Booth, in contrast, believes that it's more important than ever. Starting from a reconsideration of the concerns that led him to develop the idea in the first place, Booth goes on to show how the concept improves our understanding, not only of fiction (for which it was developed), but also of poetry and of the way we present ourselves in our day-to-day interactions.

The next two essays deal, in different ways, with another key narratological term

Ansgar Nünning, one of the critics dissatisfied with Booth's concept of the implied author. In "Reconceptualizing Unreliable Narration: Synthesizing Cognitive and Rhetorical Approaches," Nünning uses that dissatisfaction as an entry into a detailed account of the battles that have erupted over unreliable narration, with particular attention to the question of how readers in fact recognize unreliability when they come across it in the text. He argues that unreliability cannot be defined simply in terms of the text's "structural or semantic" aspects; it also involves the "conceptual frameworks" brought to the text by its readers. More generally, he contends that an adequate model of unreliability needs to combine the latest insights offered by the apparently divergent arguments of rhetorical and cognitive narrative theorists. He ends his essay, provocatively, with a series of six questions that remain to be answered.

If Nünning hopes to reduce the difficulties involved in accounting for unreliable narration by developing a new synthetic theory, Tamar Yacobi ("Authorial Rhetoric, Narratorial (Un)Reliability, Divergent Readings: Tolstoy's *Kreutzer Sonata*") offers a somewhat different perspective on the same terrain by moving up to the next level of generality. Yacobi argues that unreliability is best understood as a "reading-hypothesis" that allows readers to resolve apparent textual contradictions. She makes her case by looking at the wide disparities that separate different readings of Tolstoy's novella. After grouping these disparate readings into a few sets with common features, she goes on to show how all these groups are in turn generated by the operation of a small number of shared integrative mechanisms that readers use to deal with incongruities that arise when processing a text.

The essays by J. Hillis Miller and Dan Shen take up a different complex of problems that have long puzzled narrative theorists, problems that often show up in terms of the relation of form to content or style to meaning – or form to substance, as Miller puts it in his close reading of Henry James's *The Awkward Age* ("Henry James and 'Focalization,' or Why James Loves Gyp"). Although many narratologists have argued that the purpose of theory is not to produce new readings, Miller insists that narratological distinctions are only valuable if they serve interpretation – indeed, more radically in an age that often seems to resist judging interpretations, that they "are useful only if they lead to better readings or to better teachings of literary works." A good reading for Miller, though, is not necessarily a simple or a stable one: it can well end in a whirlpool of its own. His patient, theoretically sophisticated analysis demonstrates how, in this formally anomalous narrative (anomalous, at least, within the James canon), James succeeds in breaking down the distinction between substance and form and how the "right reading" of the text turns out to be one that reaches "undecidability" as its conclusion.

Shen, in "What Narratology and Stylistics Can Do for One Another," starts by looking at a familiar assumption: there is a rough equivalence between the story/discourse distinction central to narratological thinking (the distinction between "what" is told and "how" it is told) and the content/style distinction (what is

interchapter from Ernest Hemingway's *In Our Time* as her case in point, she goes on to show that the similarities are only superficial – and that a full understanding of style in narrative requires an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes the insights of both narratology and stylistics.

The final essay in Part I, Richard Walsh's "The Pragmatics of Narrative Fiction," turns to one of the most enduring, and most vexing, problems of narrative theory – the nature of fiction. Walsh surveys the history of attempts to explain what fiction is and how it operates, pointing out that, for all their rich variety, "modern accounts of fictionality generally turn upon one or more of a small repertoire of theoretical gambits." In addition, as he demonstrates through patient exploration of central modern accounts, especially those based in speech act theory and possible worlds theory, all these maneuvers reduce to various kinds of displacement "by detaching the fictive act from the domain of truth." (Despite their differences, there are interesting methodological similarities between Walsh's and Yacobi's essays.) As an alternative, Walsh offers a pragmatic account of fictionality in which relevance, rather than truth, becomes the key term, and he demonstrates its explanatory power by analyzing the opening of Kafka's *The Trial*.

Part II, "Revisions and Innovations," groups together essays that offer significantly new views of some basic concepts in narrative theory. The authors arrive at their fresh takes on these concepts in different ways: some focus on narratives that cannot be adequately addressed with our existing understandings, others focus on the logic of theory itself or on the uncomfortable fit between theory and readerly experience, and some use a combination of these methods. All of these essays engage in "theorypractice"; in this respect, the section provides the self-conscious reader not only with some provocative new theorizing but also an implicit primer in how to revise existing theory.

Focusing primarily on James Joyce's *Ulysses* and bringing in other avant-garde narratives of the twentieth century, Brian Richardson deftly moves "Beyond the Poetics of Plot" to consider "Alternative Forms of Narrative Progression." Richardson begins by pointing out that the dominant models, developed by R. S. Crane, Paul Ricoeur, Peter Brooks, and others, conceive of plot as a sequence of logically connected events involving coherent characters that provides, in Brooks's words, "design and intention" for a narrative. But Richardson casts doubt on these models by pointing to a tradition of novel writing that rejects this conception, moving its reader from beginning to end through radically different logics. Richardson then delivers the big payoff: an insightful survey into the range of these alternatives, starting with the multiple principles of progression in *Ulysses* and ending with what he calls the aleatory progressions of the Dadaists and their descendants such as William Burroughs.

In "They Shoot Tigers, Don't They? Path and Counterpoint in *The Long Goodbye*," Peter J. Rabinowitz's primary concern is with time – and our tools for accessing its

between treatments of time in music and narrative, and he ends by proposing that narrative theory needs a new concept, one that refers to the order in which a character experiences the events of a narrative. He calls this concept *path*, and he sees it as supplementing the well-established distinction between "story" or "*fabula*" (referring to the chronological order of events) and "discourse" or "*sjuzhet*" (referring to the order of presentation of those events). We need the concept, he argues, because characters may experience events neither in the story order nor in the discourse order, and that difference can matter for readers. Rabinowitz demonstrates the interpretive value of this concept through a revisionary reading of Raymond Chandler's *The Long Goodbye*, carefully tracing the story order, the discourse order, and the paths of Philip Marlowe and the other characters involved in the "tiger trap" episode. Recognizing the counterpoints among the different paths not only leads us to reinterpret the significance of that episode but also exposes Marlowe's failure to understand it, a revelation that overturns the standard readings of the novel.

In moving from Rabinowitz's essay to Susan Stanford Friedman's "Spatial Poetics and Arundhati Roy's *The God of Small Things*," we shift attention from time to space. Friedman observes that narrative theory has privileged time over space, and she wants to redress the balance – not by demoting time but by restoring space "to its full partnership with time as a generative force for narrative." Drawing on other theorists who have advocated more attention to space, such as Edward Soja, Mikhail Bakhtin, Franco Moretti, and Lawrence Grossberg, she proposes that we stop regarding space as a static background and begin recognizing it as an "active, mobile, and 'full'" component of narrative. More specifically, Friedman proposes that we pay more attention to the role of borders and border crossings in the generation, development, and resolution of narratives. Exploring the consequences of her spatial poetics through an energetic and insightful reading of Roy's novel, Friedman shows how the spaces in the novel contain "multiple borders of desirous and murderous connection and separation; borders that are continually erected and transgressed in movement that constitutes the kinetic drive of the plot."

Susan S. Lanser's essay, "The 'I' of the Beholder: Equivocal Attachments and the Limits of Structuralist Narratology," makes an interesting companion piece to Walsh's as it takes a fresh look at the well-known assumption that the "I" of fiction is different from the author, while the "I" of nonfiction is identical to the author. Arguing that this assumption oversimplifies the situation, she proposes a more complex scheme with three primary categories. Attached texts such as letters to the editor and scholarly essays are those in which the primary "I" and the author are identical. Detached texts are those in which the primary "I" and the author are not identical (e.g., the Pledge of Allegiance; any fiction with an unreliable narrator) or in which the relation between the two is not consequential for textual meaning (e.g., a joke, a national anthem). Equivocal texts are those in which the primary "I" is both associated with and distinct from the author, moving between being attached and detached. Novels and poems are typically equivocal texts. Lanser builds on this taxonomy by

attached, while novels are detached – but that under many conditions these default lines are transgressed. Readers intuitively know how to navigate these fault lines, but theorists have rarely paid attention to how they manage to do so. Lanser's essay, with its suggestive analyses of how we read such different works as Sharon Olds's poem "Son," Ann Beattie's short story "Find and Replace," and Philip Roth's novel *The Human Stain*, provides a theoretical scheme that accounts for these interpretive practices.

In "Neonarrative; or, How to Render the Unnarratable in Realist Fiction and Contemporary Film," Robyn Warhol offers a different kind of taxonomy, one based on the conventions governing what can and cannot be represented in narrative. Warhol examines the phenomena of the "disnarrated" and "the unnarrated" as instances of the larger category of the "unnarratable" in order to identify genre conventions and changes in those conventions. The disnarrated, first identified by Gerald Prince, is the narration of something that might have happened or was imagined to have happened but did not actually happen. The unnarrated is the lack of narration about something that did happen; it can be found in those passages in a narrative "that explicitly do not tell what is supposed to have happened, foregrounding the narrator's refusal to narrate." Both the disnarrated and the unnarrated are, for Warhol, strategies for representing the unnarratable, which she divides into four types: the subnarratable (that which is taken for granted and so not worthy of narration); the supranarratable (that which is ineffable); the antinarratable (that which social convention labels as unacceptable for narration); and the paranarratable (that which formal conventions render unnarratable). Building on these categories, Warhol shows how, over time, Hollywood films have created what she calls "neonarratives" by transgressing the formal or social conventions governing the unnarratable.

In "Self-consciousness as a Narrative Feature and Force: Tellers vs. Informants in Generic Design," Meir Sternberg turns to a neglected feature of narrative representation, self-consciousness – not just of narrators but also of characters. Sternberg makes three crucial claims: (1) self-consciousness should be mapped along a continuum from total to totally absent, from what he calls tellers who are fully aware of audiences other than themselves to informants whose only audience is themselves; (2) self-consciousness is always mediated – the narrator's mediated by the author, the characters' by the narrator and the mimetic situation; and (3) the significance of self-consciousness for narrative's form and functioning has not yet been appreciated. Sternberg offers a careful elaboration and exemplification of these points, including an analysis of why the phenomenon has not yet been given its due. The result is a persuasive case that the phenomenon of self-consciousness – in particular, the unself-conscious end of the continuum – deserves much more attention.

In "Effects of Sequence, Embedding, and Ekphrasis in Poe's 'The Oval Portrait,'" Emma Kafalenos offers another approach to understanding the structure of narrative, as she employs function analysis to explore the interrelation of the three terms of her title in Poe's story. Revising models proposed in the work of Vladimir Propp and

proceed through a series of five stages: equilibrium, disruption, efforts by characters (or actants) at alleviating the disruption, the success or failure of those efforts, and finally the establishment of a new equilibrium. In examining the Poe story, which involves both ekphrasis (the representation of a visual composition in a literary work) and an embedded narrative, Kafalenos makes good on her contention that "function analysis demonstrates the magnitude of the effect that the way events are told can have on interpretations of the causes and effects of those events." More specifically, Kafalenos shows how the final paragraph in Poe's story, which narrates the death of a young girl, has one effect in a function analysis of the embedded narrative and another, different, effect in a function analysis of the story as a whole. Furthermore, she identifies the factors that contribute to this difference, paying special attention to the role of ekphrasis. This insightful reading of "The Oval Portrait" thus serves as a model for the way we understand (1) the link between the events of an embedded narrative and those in its frame, and (2) the role of ekphrasis in narrative.

Kafalenos focuses on one kind of "intratextuality," as she examines the interaction of several texts represented or embedded within a single story. Seymour Chatman's essay, "Mrs. Dalloway's Progeny: *The Hours* as Second-degree Narrative," shifts attention to intertextuality. His exploration builds on Gérard Genette's work in *Palimpsests* on second-degree texts (texts that are explicitly intertextual with a prior, source text). After sorting out the different kinds of relations a second-degree narrative can have to its source, Chatman turns to Michael Cunningham's *The Hours*, his homage to Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*. Chatman illuminates Cunningham's novel by considering it as what Genette calls a "transposition," a work that invents new characters but uses the source text as a basis for either revisions or patterns. More specifically, Chatman treats *The Hours* as a "complement" to *Mrs. Dalloway*, a narrative that does not seek to displace the source even as it transforms it. Within this framework, Chatman focuses on the "how" of the transposition, tracing many relations between elements of the two novels. Because Chatman attends both to similarities and to differences, he is able to show Cunningham's indebtedness to Woolf as well as Cunningham's creative use of his source. More generally, Chatman's analysis works to illuminate the specific craft of each novel – and the value of his approach to second-degree narratives.

Part III brings together essays that consider "Narrative Form and Its Relationship to History, Politics, and Ethics." This section moves from biblical narrative to contemporary medical narrative, that last essay providing a bridge to Part IV's move "Beyond Literary Narrative."

David Richter's "Genre, Repetition, Temporal Order: Some Aspects of Biblical Narratology" begins with an acknowledgment of the challenges biblical narrative presents to narratological models: it is not written by clearly identifiable authors, its coherence cannot be assumed, and, indeed, its generic identity is often unclear. What, then, can narratology offer to biblical studies? Richter answers that a flexible,

order can yield significant interpretive dividends. He starts by showing that different readings of the book of Jonah stem from different assumptions about its genre. Richter defends the view that it is satirical fable, but he emphasizes that such a generic classification is likely to meet resistance because it entails accepting the idea that some parts of the Bible are fiction. With his second example, the multiple uses of repetition in the first book of Samuel, Richter works through their many possible interpretations to arrive at the significant role of the redactor. He then proposes that the repetitions end up making Samuel 1 a precursor of *Rashomon* or Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom*, in which the motives of the tellers take on greater interest than the story they tell. Richter's third example is the temporal order of the second book of Samuel; here late revelations lead to a radical reconfiguration of our understanding of David's character. These narratologically grounded interpretations help explain, Richter argues, why religions have preferred to focus on "pericopes" (short segments detached from context) rather than the Bible as a continuous narrative whole.

Questions about the historical stability of narratological categories continue in Harry E. Shaw's "Why Won't Our Terms Stay Put?: The Narrative Communication Diagram Scrutinized and Historicized." Shaw argues for the necessary relation among our understanding of basic tools of narrative theory, our larger conceptions of narrative, and the history of narrative. Focusing on the famous diagram that charts the movement of narrative communication from real author through implied author, narrator, text, narratee, implied reader, and, finally to real reader, Shaw begins by showing how our different interests give different meanings to elements of the diagram. Those committed to a rhetorical view of narrative find the concept of the implied author a necessary element, while those committed to a view of narrative as information find the concept unnecessary. (In this part of his argument, Shaw is offering his own intervention in the debate about implied authors raised at the beginning of the volume in the essays by Booth and Nünning.) Developing the distinction between rhetoric and information further, Shaw notes that Genette's Law – the dictum that as we move across the diagram from tellers to audiences, the entities become less substantive – is especially relevant for the rhetorician: while information-oriented theorists can give solidity to the narratee by restricting it to its observable presence in the text, rhetoricians are better served by folding their insights about the narratee back into their understanding of the narrator. After demonstrating the consequences of this view for his reading of Thackeray's narrator in *Vanity Fair*, Shaw makes a self-conscious turn, showing the historical inflection of his own argument. He notes that his theoretical predilections are part and parcel of his interest in accounting for a specific period in the history of narrative, the nineteenth-century British novel.

Alison Case's "Gender and History in Narrative Theory: The Problem of Retrospective Distance in *David Copperfield* and *Bleak House*" continues Shaw's focus on the necessary connection between form and history in the nineteenth-century British novel, though her view of the terrain is different because she looks through the lens of feminist narratology. Her essay, in effect, adds a missing historical dimension to James

that the technique is in play when the narration of a naïve character narrator is not informed by the changes that his or her narrative eventually reveals. Phelan also contends that the technique, though it violates strict mimesis, is often effective because it allows the author to render the character's change with the most emotional force. Case argues that Phelan's account works for twentieth-century cases but that in the nineteenth century the technique is often part of "a gendered literary code." Specifically, paradoxical paralipsis marks a narrator as "feminine" — which does not necessarily mean "female" — by revealing a lack of authoritative control over the narrative. Case develops her argument by contrasting Dickens's different approaches to the same problem in *Bleak House* and in *David Copperfield*: how to use a retrospective character narrator to represent sympathetically that figure's prior naïve consciousness. In Esther Summerson's narration, Dickens uses paradoxical paralipsis and other devices that signal Esther's lack of narrative mastery, whereas in David's narration, he uses commentary from the narrator's perspective that calls attention to David's mastery. Furthermore, Case argues, in establishing these links among gender, technique, and narrative mastery, Dickens is typical of his age.

James Phelan's "Narrative Judgments and the Rhetorical Theory of Narrative: Ian McEwan's *Atonement*" shifts from a focus on form and history to a focus on form and ethics. Phelan's major theoretical claim is that the concept of narrative judgment is central to a rhetorical understanding of narrative form, narrative ethics, and narrative aesthetics, because judgment functions as the hinge that allows each domain to open into the other two. Phelan develops the claim through his identification of three kinds of judgments (interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic), his articulation of six theses about their interrelation, and his analysis of *Atonement*, a complex novel that intertwines the problems of ethical judgments by its characters with the problems of readers' ethical judgments of its storytelling: *Atonement* is overtly concerned with the relation between transgression and atonement as it shows, first, 13-year-old Briony Tallis's well-meaning misidentification of her sister's lover as a sexual assailant and, second, Briony's realization of her mistake and her efforts to make amends. But after showing Briony on the verge of atonement, McEwan reveals that he has encouraged a misidentification on his audience's part: this novel we have been reading is not only his but Briony's. Furthermore, within the world of both their novels, Briony's error has been real but her atonement is pure fiction: her sister and her lover were never reunited and, in fact, died before such a reunion could even be possible. Thus we need to come to terms both with the ethics of Briony's decision to fictionalize her past and with the ethics of McEwan's misidentification of the narrative we have been reading. Phelan contends that McEwan guides us to see Briony's justification as ethically and aesthetically deficient even as he succeeds in making his own misidentification increase the aesthetic and ethical power of the novel.

The next two essays deal with lifewriting. Alison Booth's "The Changing Faces of Mount Rushmore: Collective Portraiture and Participatory National Heritage" investigates the connection between portraits and biographies and between collective

biography gets included in galleries of literary figures and at sites designed to memorialize significant parts of American history such as Mount Rushmore and the Hall of Fame of Great Americans. In each case, Booth traces a complex interaction among the choice of an individual portrait (and its implied biography), the development of a collective portrait (for which she uses the term "prosopography"), and the significance of that collective portrait for the larger national community. Prosopography inevitably raises the political question of representativeness, of who gets included or excluded and why. Consequently, as Booth notes in her summary, prosopography involves its "presenters as well as the audience in collective memorial representation, claiming a certain kinship in cultural heritage, forming a conjunction of biography and history, and leaving a palpable afterimage of what is missing."

Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson continue the focus on lifewriting in "The Trouble with Autobiography: Cautionary Notes for Narrative Theorists" — but they do so by raising significantly different kinds of questions. They explore four particular trouble spots in autobiographical practice that deserve more attention from narrative theory. First, Smith and Watson analyze different motives for and effects of hoaxes (and claims about hoaxes), though they conclude this section by underlining how, whatever the motives, an autobiographical hoax induces a feeling of betrayal in its reader. Their discussion of the second trouble spot, the postcolonial play with the borders of fiction and nonfiction, includes both claims for autobiography in telling the story of another and claims for fiction in telling the story of oneself. Such experimentation, Smith and Watson contend, interrogates "the complicity of the autobiography canon and its critics with dominant modes of self-representation and truth-telling." Next they turn to autobiographical narratives that bear witness to human rights abuses, which often place the autobiographical subject in the position of speaking for the collective and of appealing to the audience for recognition. These appeals, in turn, place a particular ethical burden on the audience since recognizing the writer's experience also entails doing something with that recognition. Finally, in a discussion of materiality, Smith and Watson note that contemporary mixed media autobiography raises questions about the links among the body, the medium of representation, and the autobiographical subject. Like so many essays in the collection, this one ends in a kind of self-conscious spin: all four trouble spots, Smith and Watson contend, simultaneously receive illumination from and offer challenges to contemporary narrative theory.

Gerald Prince picks up one thread of Smith and Watson's discussion of postcolonial lifewriting and weaves it into a larger essay "On a Postcolonial Narratology." Prince explains that his version of this hybrid "would . . . adopt and rely on the results of (post)classical narratology but would inflect it and perhaps enrich it by wearing a set of postcolonial lenses to look at narrative." Prince elaborates on this conception by moving, with impressive swiftness and clarity, through a remarkable number of narratological categories and suggesting how they would look from this new perspective. To take just a few examples, with voice, one would focus on its "linguistic power or communal representativeness"; with narrator, one would look at postcolonial status

do with space what Susan Friedman does in her essay – pay attention to border crossings and heterotopia. Prince concludes the essay by placing his sketch of a postcolonial narratology within a larger vision of three important projects for contemporary and future narrative theory: (1) the continued re-examination and revision of existing categories through the consideration of new examples of narrative – as in this essay; (2) studying the role of various elements of narrative as part of an effort to establish an empirical basis for narratology; and (3) reviving the effort to develop a model of narrative competence. In this portion of his essay, Prince looks back to the kinds of concerns motivating the essays in Parts I and II, while also looking ahead to those raised in the Epilogue.

This look to the future continues in Melba Cuddy-Keane's "Modernist Soundscapes and the Intelligent Ear: An Approach to Narrative Through Auditory Perception." This essay could serve as another model for the first of Prince's projects for the future, since it seeks to develop a vocabulary and methodology for dealing with representations of sound in narrative. At the same time, the essay resonates with the work of Shaw and Case when it makes a historical claim that "modernity occasioned new experiences for the 'human sensorium,' stimulating both a new perceptual knowledge and a new apprehension of perception," especially auditory perception. Cuddy-Keane brings these two main concerns of the essay together in her analysis of Virginia Woolf's representations of sound perception in her fiction. Drawing on such terms as *auscultation*, *auscultize*, and *auscultizer* (patterned on focalization, focalize, and focalizer, narratology's terms for describing vision) as well as *soundmark* and *soundscape* (patterned on landmark and landscape), Cuddy-Keane demonstrates the range, innovation, and importance of Woolf's use of soundscapes from "Kew Gardens" to *The Years*. Cuddy-Keane's supple analyses show that "by reading for sonics rather than semantics, . . . we discover new forms of making narrative sense."

Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan's essay, "In Two Voices, or: Whose Life/Death/Story Is It, Anyway?," is a meditation on the ethics of the double illness narrative by Ilana Hammerman and her husband Jürgen Nieraad, *Under the Sign of Cancer: A Journey of No Return*. The first half of the book is Nieraad's account of his terminal illness, acute myeloid leukemia; the second half is Hammerman's account of that same illness told from her perspective after Nieraad's death. Rimmon-Kenan structures her treatment as "a series of concentric circles: the relations between the dying husband and his wife, the twofold act of narration, the appropriation of both husband and wife by the medical 'system,' published responses to the narrative by doctors and other readers, and my own appropriation as evidenced in this essay." The result is an analysis that, like Phelan's, links matters of narrative form and ethics, though Rimmon-Kenan's focus on this nonfictional illness narrative and published responses to it – as well as her own reflections on her personal investment in the issues raised by the narrative – leads her to a rather different set of ethical questions. Is Hammerman's narrative inevitably an appropriation of Nieraad's experience? Is it a just indictment of the medical system? Is Rimmon-Kenan's own analysis yet another appropriation?

answer definitively the question of her title, she offers a compelling example of the intellectual whirlpools that can result from a serious ethical engagement with narrative.

As we've said, narrative theory has an expansionist quality; and in Part IV, "Beyond Literary Narrative," we gather up seven essays that exemplify its ability to contribute to fields well beyond the traditionally literary. Contribute to – or swallow up? Even among narrative theorists, there are doubts about the impact of this expansionist (one might even say imperialist) potential, as revealed by the questions raised in several of these essays.

The section moves, generally, from verbal to nonverbal fields. We begin with two essays discussing the power of unacknowledged narrative mechanisms in contemporary culture. First, in "Narrative in and of the Law," Peter Brooks reflects on the "role of storytelling" in the legal realm. Stories are absolutely central to legal practice, but, according to Brooks, the law rarely admits their centrality openly. Instead, it recognizes the importance of stories only implicitly and only negatively, through "its efforts at policing narrative," a policing that manages "the conditions of telling" so that "narratives reach those charged with judging them in controlled, rule-governed forms." Narrative content, in other words, is repressed – and kept "under erasure." Brooks ends his essay by calling for a "legal narratology," especially one that deals with the reception and construction of stories by the listeners: judges and juries.

Alan Nadel, in "Second Nature, Cinematic Narrative, the Historical Subject, and *Russian Ark*," studies the impact of unacknowledged conventions in narrative cinema. Although most viewers have come to accept their position while watching narrative films as "natural," in fact such films "naturalize a counterintuitive experience by creating the illusion that the viewer has acquired a privileged window on reality." This naturalization requires viewers to engage in a kind of learning as forgetting which has significant social and psychological consequences. Nadel focuses on the conventions of the "Classical Hollywood Style" – exemplified here in particular by the use of the close-up – and concludes with an analysis of Alexander Sukurov's 2002 film *Russian Ark* that shows how it "calls into question that style and the history of cinematic narrative in which it participates."

The next three essays deal with music, an area that would seem, at first, even further removed from narrative concerns than law and film. In "Narrativizing the End: Death and Opera," Linda and Michael Hutcheon argue that, in order to account for opera's synthesis of music and story, standard narratological models need to be significantly altered. They demonstrate the power of such an alteration by turning to a question about operas that center on suffering and death: how do such works of art produce pleasure? Expanding the work of traditional narrative theorists (especially that of Frank Kermode), they propose that the shared public experience of opera, much like the Early Modern practice of *contemplatio mortis*, allows its audience to "rehearse death" and to confront its "mortal anxieties."

In "Music and/as Cine-Narrative; Or, *Ceci n'est pas un leitmotif*," Royal S. Brown looks at a different kind of music attached to an independent story: film music. Traditional accounts of film music have privileged the narrative aspects of this independent story, reducing the music to little more than a catalog of themes and motifs that double the narrative that we see on the screen. Brown looks instead at the "quasi-narrative properties" found in the music itself in the form of the codes on which Western music depends. He zeroes in on the ways in which film music interacts with our notions of time in the title sequences composed by Hugo Friedhofer for *The Best Years of Our Lives* and by Bernard Herrmann for *North by Northwest*. His analysis demonstrates how film music, "through violations of strictly musical codes" familiar from the concert hall, "often rises above" the literal-minded duplication of the screen action, providing a commentary that, at its best, provides "a kind of meta-text whose 'story' is the very substance of narrative."

In the last of the musical essays, "Classical Instrumental Music and Narrative," Fred Everett Maus deals with music that seems, on the surface, even further removed from narrative concerns: nonprogrammatic instrumental music. Maus charts out the major arguments in the debates that have arisen since musicologists first started to take narrative theory seriously in the 1970s, with particular attention to the work of Marion A. Guck, Susan McClary, and Anthony Newcomb. He then offers his own intervention, arguing that the relationship between music and narrative is a loose analogy and that we should think more carefully about the "poetics" of texts *about* music (rather than considering them simply as literal representations of the music they discuss). From this base, he launches his most important argument: we should think not about musical works as ideal objects that are stable and consistent but rather about the "diversity of the dramatic successions that different performers may create, even when starting from the same score." Maus demonstrates this point with a careful analysis of several different performances of a passage from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony.

Most of the essays in this collection ground their arguments in the details of a particular text. In "I'm Spartacus!" Catherine Gunther Kodat does something substantially different – she studies a particular figure, Spartacus, who shows up in many different narratives, posing the question of why we continue to be fascinated by a figure (a term she picks with care) so inextricably tied to defeat. To answer the question, Kodat chooses to treat the repetition of Spartacus figures as an instance of what she calls, after J. M. Bernstein, eidetic variation. At first glance, Kodat argues, Spartacus appears to reveal "the strength of a single figure to hold together a crumbling narrative (the fragmentary, incomplete, and contradictory early histories of a slave rebellion in which Spartacus is the common thread)"; but her exploration of the various versions of "Spartacus" in different media (especially Howard Fast's novel, Stanley Kubrick's film, and Aram Khachaturian's ballet) reveals, rather, an underlying tension between narrative (as ground) and Spartacus as a figure that narrative cannot, in fact, contain. In the end, Spartacus emerges as a queer figure whose story is inevitably "our" story.

The most radical essay in this section is arguably the one by Peggy Phelan, "Shards

Focusing on the history of performance art, Phelan self-consciously explores both the need for and (like Kodat) the limitations of narrative. Taking as her primary example the action painting of Jackson Pollock, she confronts a glaring paradox. On the one hand, narrative is necessary for anyone who wants to produce a history of performance art. On the other hand, as she shows in her account of the way Pollock's work has been treated by critics (in particular critics who discuss it through the mediation of Namuth's photographs of Pollock's work), narrative itself serves to counteract the very spirit of performance art, whose purpose is "to unsettle the distinction between subject and object, between doing and telling." The essay ends with one of her experiments in "performative writing," as she reflects on Pollock's action painting via prose "that remains alive to action, whose telling force resides in each breath of the renewing present tense."

The Epilogue contains two essays that, like the end of Gerald Prince's, consider recent developments in narrative and implicitly or explicitly point the way toward the future of both narrative and narrative theory. Marie-Laure Ryan's "Narrative and Digitality: Learning to Think With the Medium" explores the development of digital narrative over the last 25 years by focusing on the relation between the potential of software systems and the realization of that potential in actual narratives. Ryan offers a skillful survey of what she calls the "affordances" of three major kinds of digital narrative: interactive fiction based on Infocom software; hypertext narrative based on Storyspace software; and mixed-media narrative based on Flash software. She then builds on the survey to develop her larger theoretical point about "thinking with the medium," her phrase for taking advantage of the potentiality of software. Thinking with the medium "is not the overzealous exploitation of all the features offered by the authoring system, but an art of compromise between the affordances of the system and the demands of [narrative] meaning." From this perspective, one should not judge digital narrative by the criteria of print narrative because the technologies underlying each kind of narrative provide very different affordances. In other words, digital narrative should not be found wanting because it is not as good as Shakespeare or Proust but rather should be judged by how well it takes advantage of its potential to offer "freely explorable narrative archives; dynamic interplay between words and image; and active participation in fantasy worlds," such as we find in multiplayer online computer games.

The final essay, H. Porter Abbott's "The Future of All Narrative Futures," is a meditation on the power of narrative form and its consequences for the future of narrative, based on Abbott's analysis of current "technologically assisted" narrative entertainments. Although he begins by noting that such narratives (MOOs and MUDs as well as the kinds Ryan analyzes) have expanded the domain of narrative and focused more attention on interactivity, Abbott ultimately sees more similarity than difference between the fundamental structures of these narratives and print narrative than Ryan does. But Abbott takes the investigation further by asking

behavior and cognition, one moving us away from coherent master-narratives toward more fragmentary, open-ended, local narratives. Turning to a reading of the contemporary political scene, including a consideration of the conflicting master-narratives of the September 11, 2001 terrorists and of George W. Bush and his followers, Abbott again suggests that the old structures remain in place. This answer, however, suggests the next question: what is the relation between current developments in narrative e-entertainments and the old structures? Abbott finds in these developments a resistance to "the givenness of narrative," and a correspondingly greater interest in the "prenarratable," that is, experience that is not yet shaped into narrative. More generally, Abbott suggests that this oscillation between the prenarratable and narrative corresponds with a similar oscillation between living and narrating our lives, an oscillation that he sees as necessary for our mental health. Consequently, "the often wonderful developments in the technology of entertainment will continue largely to take place within constraints, narrative or otherwise, that give us the illusion that time itself has a shape and that somehow we are equipped to read it."

As we look back on this introduction's navigation – and that of our contributors – between the stony clarity of apparently well-grounded knowledge and the whirling waters of theoretical and interpretive innovation, we see several larger conclusions. (1) Contemporary narrative theory is a flourishing enterprise precisely because it remains strongly aware of its history and tradition even as it pursues its commitment to innovation. If one navigational mistake is to steer too close to either Scylla or Charybdis, an equally grave mistake is to sail on oblivious to both. (2) There is no one best way to navigate between tradition and innovation, and the field is flourishing because its scholars have developed multiple paths even as they continue to invent new ones. (3) The ongoing work of our contributors will play a substantial role in the further flourishing of the field.

Prologue

Glossary

actant: in structuralist narratology, any of the basic roles in the action structure of a narrative. Greimas, who originated the term, described six actantial roles (subject, object, sender, receiver, helper, and opponent), but the term is often used more loosely to refer to a character considered in terms of his or her structural function in the action – a hero (subject) or villain (opponent), for instance. The same actantial role can be held by more than one character (there may be many opponents, for example) in a given narrative; similarly, the same character can perform more than one actantial role (for example, a character who is initially a helper may also be an opponent). See also *passant*.

analepsis, analeptic: flashback. Analeptic passages interrupt the forward movement of narrative time by narrating material (events, an image, a figure of speech) from an earlier time in the chronology.

antinarratable: that which, according to a given narrative, should not be told, due to social convention or taboo.

attached text, or contingent text: one in which the primary “I” is assumed to be the author of the work; one whose meaning depends on the equation of the textual voice with that of the author. Editorials and scholarly essays are attached texts.

auditory percept: the subjectively perceived auditory object resulting from the translation, by the hearing process, of the acoustic waveform into meaningful sound. Distinguished from “sensations” and “concepts,” the percept is produced by a complex interaction of physiological and cognitive processes.

auditory restoration, or continuity effect: the perceptual filling in of missing sound when it has been masked or replaced by louder sound of similar frequency. When the gap is filled by such noise and not by silence, we perceive the obliterated or interrupted sound as steady or continuous, unless we have other cues to the contrary.

auditory streaming, auditory scene analysis, or perceptual/auditory grouping: the process of perceptually organizing the single continuous waveform produced by multiple sound sources into separate meaningful sounds. Streaming includes perceiving sounds (including harmonics and reverberations) as emanating from a single source (stream integration or fusion) and processing them into different streams (stream segregation or fission).

auscultation, auscultize, auscultator: terms referring to the perceptual representation of sound in literature (who hears?), paralleling the terms *focalization*, *focalize*, and *focalizer*. Auscultation may be regarded as a subspecies of the broader concept *focalization* (who perceives?) or distinguished from *focalization* if the latter is used specifically to refer to sight (who sees?).

authorial audience: the hypothetical ideal audience for whom the author constructs the text and who understands it perfectly. The authorial audience of fiction, unlike the *narrative audience* (defined below), operates with the tacit knowledge that the characters and events are synthetic constructs rather than real people and historical happenings.

catachresis: an anomalous trope in which a word with a known literal meaning is used as the name of something that has no literal name. The commonest examples tend to be parts of the human body projected on the natural world, as in “face of the mountain,” or “tongues of flame.”

chronotope: the temporal and spatial dimensions of narrative discourse. Bakhtin coined the term in “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel” and defined it as “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed.”

coreference: see *reference*

countermemory: a term drawn from the work of Michel Foucault that indicates lost or hidden cultural practices (memories, narratives) brought to light by genealogical investigations of history.

culture industry: a phrase coined by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, deployed most famously in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, to describe the application of Fordist principles of mass production and consumption to the creation and dissemination of cultural artifacts.

deixis: the function of certain words (demonstrative pronouns, definite articles, temporal adverbs) to locate referents in place and time relative to the speaker's location. In a narrative utterance such as “I realized that this apple was now better than that orange,” “this” and “that” have the deictic function of indicating that the apple is closer to the “I” than the orange, while “now” has the deictic function of indicating both some change over time and the speaker's current realization. The

conveying the past – is linked to the narrative convention of the past tense often functioning to signify the present time of the narrated events.

detached text: one in which the author's identity is understood as dissociated from the identity of the textual "I"; one in which the author cannot be equated with the textual "I" or in which the relation between the author and the primary "I" is not consequential for textual meaning. Advertisements and national anthems are detached texts.

dialogism: according to Bakhtin, a property of the language of novels whereby utterances or instances of **discourse** in a novel, whether associated with characters or the narrator, are oriented toward other utterances, either within the same novel or outside it in the wider social arena. That is, utterances anticipate other utterances, respond to them, polemicize against them openly or surreptitiously, mimic or parody them, and so forth. Some types of discourse (e.g., **free indirect discourse**) incorporate both parties to this dialogue within their own structure, and so are said to be "double-voiced."

diegesis: (1) the narrative world, whether fictional or nonfictional; and (2) telling, as in summarizing or commenting, as opposed to showing via dialogue or performance. The first sense of the term provides the root for a family of terms: **extradiegetic** refers to situations that are not properly part of the main narrative world; a narrator who is not part of the action he or she narrates is an extradiegetic narrator. **Intradiegetic** refers to situations within that main narrative world; an intradiegetic narrator is one whose narration is framed by another narrator as Marlow is in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*; that frame narrator is extradiegetic. (Note, however, that an intradiegetic narrator can also be a heterodiegetic narrator, if he or she does not participate in the action narrated; Chaucer's pilgrim narrators on their way to Canterbury, for example, are both intradiegetic and heterodiegetic.) See also **heterodiegetic narration**, **homodiegetic narration**, and **metalepsis**.

discourse: the set of devices for telling a story, including vision or focalization (who perceives?), voice (who speaks?), duration (how long it takes something to be told), frequency (whether something is told in singulative or iterative manner), and speed (how much story time is covered by a stretch of discourse). In structuralist narratology, discourse is regarded as the "how" of narrative, distinct from the "what" – character, event, and setting.

disnarration: a technique in which a narrator recounts something that does not happen.

ekphrasis: the representation of a musical or sound composition in a literary work.

ekphrasis: the representation of a visual composition in a literary work.

equivocal text: one in which the primary voice of the text is assumed to be at once

between the "I" of the text and the author's "I" is indeterminate or variable. Novels and poems are equivocal texts.

existential mechanism: a reading-hypothesis that links and resolves problematic elements of a fictional text in terms of some reality model, like the world of science fiction or of Kafka's "Metamorphosis."

extension: the process by which a new narrative imitates an original, but does not constitute a sequel to it (does not continue the life of the original characters); rather the new narrative places the new characters in situations parallel to those experienced by the original characters.

fabula: the sequence of a narrative's events in chronological order; more generally, the what of narrative before it is rendered in **discourse**.

fictive, fictional, fictitious: these terms are often used synonymously, but can be usefully distinguished as follows: **fictive** means "fiction producing, imaginative," and applies to (authorial) **discourse**; **fictional** means "characteristic of fiction, imagined," and applies primarily to **story** (note, however, that a *represented* discourse would normally be fictional, not fictive); and **fictitious** means "unreal, imaginary," and applies to the events and existents, or the particulars, of story.

focalization: the answer to the question "who is perceiving?" in narrative discourse. Gérard Genette noted that the term "point of view" conflated two distinct aspects of narrative discourse: voice (the answer to the question "who is speaking?") and vision or focalization. Since Genette's identification of the concept, narratologists have been debating how best to describe it and account for its effects.

free indirect discourse: a locution in a narrative in which the narrator represents a character's speech or thought by blending the character's expression with his or her own. In direct discourse, the narrator would quote the character's thought: "He thought, 'I am going home to sleep it off.'" In indirect discourse, the narrator would report the character's thought: "He thought that he would go home to sleep it off." In free indirect discourse, the narrator would drop the framing "he thought": "He would go home to sleep it off."

functional mechanism: a reading-hypothesis that imposes order on divergent and discontinuous textual elements in terms of the (e.g., thematic, rhetorical) ends that require that divergence.

genealogy: for Foucault, a practice of historical writing, indebted to Nietzschean critique. As Foucault explains in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," the practice attends to the "accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" and so "discover[s] that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of

generic mechanism: a reading-hypothesis that explains a work's simplifications of reality and other discordances by appeal to its kind, as when we say that comedy typically makes its older characters function primarily as obstacles to the lovers of the younger generation.

genetic mechanism: a reading-hypothesis that resolves fictive oddities and inconsistencies in terms of the causal factors that produced the text without coming to form part of it, for example, the creative process.

heterodiegetic narration: Gérard Genette's term for narration in which the narrator exists at different level of existence from the characters.

heterotopia: an external place that is simultaneously "real" (limited, concrete, not utopian) and also full of relational references to other places and disciplinary institutions. The term is Foucault's neologism in "Of Other Places" to refer to actual places that acquire intense meanings through their existence within a larger set of spatial and temporal social relations – for example, cemeteries, brothels, prisons, theaters, honeymoon hotels, museums, libraries.

historical present: in both ordinary speech and narrative art, the narration of past events and experiences in the present tense. As such, it is distinguishable from narration in the present tense of events as they occur (**simultaneous narration**).

homodiegetic narration, or character narration: Gérard Genette's term for narration in which the narrator exists at the same level of existence as the other characters. When the character narrator is also the protagonist, homodiegetic narration can be further specified as **autodiegetic**.

hypertext: a collection of texts or text fragments interconnected by links. The presence of a plurality of links out of a given fragment creates a choice of reading orders which gives hypertext what is generally called a nonlinear character, though **multilinear** is a more appropriate term, given the inevitable linearity of language. Primarily a mode of access to documents within a database, hypertext is the basic structure of Internet sites, but the format has also been used in literary narrative, both print and digital. Digital hypertext fiction allows the reader to click on highlighted links to move to new segments (words, graphics, sounds) of the narrative. See also **interactivity**, **lexias**.

implied author: the version of the real author responsible for the choices that create the narrative text as "these words in this order" and that imbues the text with his or her values.

informant: an unself-conscious transmitter, or quotee, whose originally private discourse mediates and serves another's higher-level, framing communication. The informant thus opposes the narrator as well as the author. Examples range from the

integration mechanisms: the means by which readers transform apparent textual incongruities into coherent parts of the larger text. See the five particular mechanisms: the **existential**, the **functional**, the **generic**, the **genetic**, and the hypothesis of **unreliable narration**.

interactive fiction: a purely textual type of computer game in which the user solves problems by participating in a dialogue with the machine. The player of interactive fiction impersonates a character in a fictional world by typing sentences which count in the fictional world as the actions of the character. The system updates the state of the fictional world in response to these events, and the player gives new input, in a feedback loop that runs until a terminal state of winning or losing is reached.

interactivity: participation of reader/spectators in the actual production of the narrative text, especially participation that affects the information displayed to the reader/spectator. Interactivity is mainly a property of digital texts, thanks to the feedback loops through which computers accept input that determine their inner state and their output. Multipath texts realized in print are sometimes regarded as interactive, though these texts lack the dynamic behavior and agency of digital texts. Interactivity can be either strictly selective or productive: in the selective variety the user's participation is limited to clicking on hyperlinks, while in the productive form, the user's input consists of text or simulated actions that become events in a fictional world.

lexias: (1) a term introduced by Roland Barthes referring to the "contiguous fragments" that make up a narrative. Generally brief, though arbitrary in length, they are the "units of reading" as determined by the reader. (2) In **hypertext** fiction, a term borrowed from Barthes by George P. Landow and now generally used to refer to fragments of hypertext narrative, fashioned as such by the writer yet commonly arranged in an order devised by the reader.

mediation: **mimetic** motivation; that is, the process by which elements of a text are made to seem inevitable as a result of their conforming to (some model of) reality. Mimetic motivation thus has two main branches, the **existential** (appealing to whatever counts as objective reality) and the **perspectival** (a subject's distinctive, fallible view of reality).

medium: a channel of transmission or a type of material support for information. From the point of view of narrative theory, medium is a mode of encoding and transmitting narrative information that makes a difference as to what kind of stories can be told, how they are told, and how they are experienced. Print is one kind of medium; film is another. Medium is distinct from genre in that it consists of properties and limitations inherent to its material realization, while genre is defined by human-made conventions.

metalepsis: the breaking of the conventional barriers between diegetic levels, as, for

Woman enter the diegesis (narrative world) of his protagonist Charles Smithson. See *diegesis*.

mimetic/mimesis: mimetic refers specifically to that component of character directed to its imitation of a possible person. It refers generally to that component of fictional narrative concerned with imitating the world beyond the fiction, what we typically call "reality." Mimesis refers to the process by which the mimetic effect is produced, the set of conventions, which change over time, by which imitations are judged to be more or less adequate.

mise en abyme: the device of having part of a text mirror in miniature the larger text; for example, Shakespeare's use of the play within the play in *Hamlet*.

motivation: According to Russian Formalist theory, the process by which elements of a text (especially but not exclusively elements of discourse or "devices") are made to seem inevitable rather than arbitrary, and integral rather than anomalous. Elements may be motivated, and their presence justified, either in terms of their contribution to aesthetic and rhetorical effects, or, in mimetic motivation, by appeal to some model of reality, that is, in terms of their "realism." Elements deliberately left unmotivated are "laid bare," exposed as formal elements rather than assimilated to larger compositional or mimetic patterns.

narratee: the audience directly addressed by the narrator; the degree to which this audience gets characterized varies widely.

narrative audience: the observer role within the world of the fiction, taken on by the flesh and blood reader in that part of his or her consciousness which treats the fictional action as real. The narrative audience position, like the narratee position, is subsumed within the **authorial audience** position.

narrativity: the formal and contextual qualities distinguishing narrative from non-narrative, or marking the degree of "narrativeness" in a discourse; the rhetorical principles underpinning the production or interpretation of narrative; the specific kinds of artifice inherent in the process of narrative representation.

neonarrative: strategies for stretching generic boundaries to include matter that would previously have been unnarratable in a given genre.

paralepsis: narration that reflects a greater knowledge than the narrator could presumably have; in other words, narration in which the narrator tells more than he or she knows.

paralipsis: narration that does not reflect the narrator's full relevant knowledge; in other words, narration in which the narrator tells less than he or she knows.

paranarratable: that which, according to a given narrative, would not be told, due to

passant: a character viewed from the perspective of the impressions registered on him or her, rather than from the perspective of the actions he or she performs. A term introduced in Rabinowitz's chapter in this volume as a contrast to **actant**.

path: a character's order of experience, which may or may not coincide with the order of events in the story or in the discourse.

performative: a term from speech act theory, invented by J. L. Austin to name an enunciation which is not "constative," that is, not a putative statement of fact capable of being either true or false, but a speech act that makes something happen. A performative, in Austin's phrase, is a way of doing something with words. For example, when the minister or duly authorized civil official says at the end of a marriage ceremony, "I now pronounce you husband and wife," he or she performs the act of marrying the couple.

primacy effect: our tendency to accept as valid the information we are initially given, even when that information is contradicted later in the same message.

prolepsis, proleptic: flash-forward; the temporal counterpoint to **analepsis**. Proleptic passages interrupt the steady forward movement of narrative time by narrating material located in the narrative's future.

prosopography: literally the writing (*graphy*) of a mask or persona (*prosopon*), it incorporates the trope of *prosopopoeia*, in which a dead or absent entity is given a persona and a voice, and refers to the practice of representing the history of a nation or community as a set of representative persons, in collections of their names, portraits, and biographies. It has also referred to methods of historical analysis that compare data about the lives of groups of people in antiquity or the middle ages – when records are scarce – or modern times, when statistics about parentage, marriage, or life expectancy are ample. Less formally, it refers to collections of short biographies (collective biography) in general.

reference: the relation between an instance of a referring expression (a proper noun, definite noun phrase, pronoun, or demonstrative) and a referent (a specific person, object, place, event, etc.). Reference resolution is the interpretative act of assigning a referent (on a pragmatic and semantic basis) to an instance of a referring expression in a given context. **Coreference** is the relation between two instances of the same or different referring expressions that can be attributively (in discursive terms) or referentially (in terms of the referent) identified with each other.

second-degree text: any text that plays off an older, pre-existent text; parodies, extensions, and sequels are all examples of second-degree texts.

self-consciousness: a discourser's awareness of communicating with some audience. An authorial privilege by definition, it is delegated to narrators (or speakers/writers outside narrative) and denied to informants, with significant implications for how their respective performances as transmitters operate and make sense.

simultaneous narration: present tense narration in which there is no apparent gap between the time of the narration and the time of the event or experience narrated: in simultaneous narration living and telling occur simultaneously. See **historical present**.

sjuzhet: the *fabula* rendered in a specific narrative discourse; the synthesis of story and discourse.

soundscape: the sonic equivalent of landscape. An environment of sound, especially as it is perceived and understood by the listener or listeners. A term first employed by R. Murray Schafer, in the World Soundscape Project, along with other terms for discussing sound environments, such as soundmark (landmark), sound signal (figure), keynote sound (ground), and earwitness (eyewitness).

speech act: from the point of view of speech act theory, any utterance is not only constative (saying something) but also performative (doing something). A speech act is a purposeful, communicative use of language involving a locutionary act (producing a grammatical utterance); an illocutionary act (a purpose achieved in the process of performing the locutionary act, e.g., asserting, promising, warning, requesting, commanding); and potentially a perlocutionary act (a purpose achieved by means of performing the illocutionary act, e.g., informing, convincing, dissuading, etc.). Speech act theory resists the assumption that language use can be understood independently of its context, or purely in relation to its propositional truth value. See also **performative**.

story: the what of narrative: character, events, and setting are elements of story; the events in chronological order constitute the story abstracted from the discourse.

subnarratable: that which, according to a given narrative, need not be told, because it is so "normal" as to go without saying.

supranarratable: that which, according to a given narrative, cannot be told, because it is ineffable or inexpressible.

transposition: the process by which a new text changes an imitated text; the new text preserves a clear association with the original, but alters or even reverses its significance by modifying setting, tone, plot, and/or characters. Unlike parody and pastiche, the imitative text has serious purposes.

undecidable: a term used to describe a text that is open to two (or more) incompatible readings, each (or all) of which can be amply supported by textual evidence.

unnarration: a technique in which a narrator asserts that what happened cannot be retold in words, or explicitly indicates that what happened will not be narrated because to do so would be impossible.

unreliable narration: within the rhetorical theory of narrative, narration in which the narrator's reporting, reading (or interpreting), and/or regarding (or evaluating) are

not in accord with the implied author's. There are six main types of unreliable narration: misreporting, misreading, misregarding; underreporting, underreading, and underregarding. The two main groups can be differentiated by the activity they require on the part of the authorial audience: with the first group – misreporting, misreading, and misregarding – the audience must reject the narrator's words and reconstruct an alternative; with the second group – underreporting, underreading, and underregarding – the audience must supplement the narrator's view. Within Yacobi's complementary approach, unreliability is a reading-hypothesis that is formed to resolve textual problems (from unaccountable detail to self-contradiction) at the expense of some mediating, perceiving or communicating agent – particularly the global narrator – at odds with the implied author. See also **integration mechanisms**.

voice: in traditional narratology the answer to the question "who is speaking?" in narrative discourse; more generally, the term refers to the way in which choices of diction and syntax convey values and thus a sense of a speaker. Studying the distribution (who gets to speak) and authority (how much weight does the speech have) of voice is one way to study the politics of narration.